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Foreword 
The publication in 1975 of the "Stocktaking of the Common Agri-
cultural Policy" by the Commission of the European Communities 
encouraged an assessment of that policy in several Member States. 
In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Agriculture entrusted to the Agri-
cultural Economics Research Institute (AERI) the task of analysing 
and evaluating the objectives and policy instruments of the common 
agricultural policy. This evaluation was to contain three parts: 
1. statement of the qualitative and quantitative significance 
of the common agricultural policy for agriculture, and for 
the economy as a whole, in the Netherlands; 
2. consideration of the objectives and policy instruments of the 
common agricultural policy against the background of the EC 
economy ; 
3. assessment of the external effects, of the common agricultural 
policy. 
The first part of the assessment was given in an article by 
Professor J. de Hoogh published - in Dutch language - in the 1975 
AERI Annual Report. 
A report on the second part was given in two separate publi-
cations. Both were drawn up - largely under the direction of 
Professor de Hoogh - in the Staff Department by Mr G. Meester. 
Publication 1.15 - which is only available in Dutch language -
deals with the objectives, policy instruments and effects of the 
policy - principally market and price policy as carried out 
so far. The publication largely a statistical description of the 
developments in EC agriculture since 1962 and will be published 
in 1980. This publication, No. 1.16, amplifies 1.15 by comparing 
the present market and price policy with some other types of price 
and income policies. 
The analysis is of a theoretical nature and is mainly concer-
ned with setting out the economic effects of various policy in-
struments, in particular the influence of the common agricultural 
policy on EC agriculture and the EC economy as a whole. 
Only limited attention is paid to the differing economic effects 
for the separate Member States. 
Because of this limitation and becauseof the impossibility of 
evaluating economic effects on the basis of objective criteria no 
preference is expressed in the report for any one alternative. 
Even after supplementary economical research it would be impossi-
ble for a research institute like the AERI to make judgements of 
that kind. For this purpose, a political assessment of the econo-
mic and other factors is necessary. Such an assessment would, for 
example, cover questions of technical and administrative feasibi-
lity and social desirability as well as the matter of relative 
advantages and disadvantages for the individual Member States and 
whether it is desired to support agricultural incomes by the mar-
ket or - in part - by subsidies from the Treasury. This study is 
simply intended to provide a contribution to the discussion which 
precedes decision-making on the future form of the agricultural 
policy. 
The external effects' of the common agricultural policy are 
dealt with in part in the historical description as well as in 
the theoretical analysis. It is intended later to publish a sepa-
rate paper on this third part of the survey. 
This study has been published in Dutch language in February 
1979. The AERI expresses its heartfelt thanks to the Services of 
the EC Commission who provided for translation in English. 
The Hague, August 1980 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n , summary and conc lus i ons 
1.1 Introduction 
A survey of developments in European agriculture in recent 
years has shown that since the introduction of the first regula-
tions under the common agricultural policy, only part of these 
policy objectives have been achieved 1 ).Apart from the question 
whether this is the result of the policy or of others factors, 
there were in the six-member EC in the period in question a high 
and rising level of supply of agricultural products, a large in-
crease in productivity in agriculture and relatively stable prices 
for agricultural produce and foodstuffs. Moreover the increase in 
prices for agricultural produce and foodstuffs was lower in most 
Member States of the Community as originally constituted, than the 
general increase in prices. It was also noted, however, that the 
level of agricultural prices in the EC was almost permanently 
higher than outside; that for some products there were frequently 
imbalances between supply and demand, which gave rise to formation 
of stocks; and that producers from non-member countries lost scope, 
in relative terms, for sale of agricultural produce to EC markets. 
The survey also showed that for the whole period the average in-
come per head of the population employed in agriculture remained 
lower than the average income per head for the working population 
as a whole. Finally, the aimed harmonisation of prices in the 
Community were still not achieved and government expenditure on 
agricultural policy rose substantially. 
Alternative policies for study 
There are numerous publications which suggest the introduc-
tion of other forms of agricultural policies, arguing that these 
alternative policies would be more suitable for achieving the 
desired objectives than the present policy. 
This report compares some of the suggested alternatives with 
one another and with the existing policy. The intention of this 
is to provide some insight into the extent to which these alter-
natives would in fact better contribute towards achieving the 
policy objectives. 
1 ) The results of this survey will be published in 1980 in Dutch 
language in AERI publication no. 1.15 called:"Doeleinden, in-
strumenten en effecten van het huidige landbouwbeleid in de 
EG".("Objectives, policy instruments and effects of the present 
EC agricultural policy"). 
This report is restricted to comparison of certain forms of 
price and income policy and does not cover other parts of the 
overall agricultural policy (structural policy; policies concer-
ning education, research and advisory, etc.)- We feel we can make 
this restriction since these other areas of policy, unlike price 
policy, are primarily the responsibility of the various Member 
States' governements rather than of the EC. 
The report makes a distinction between two groups of alter-
native policies: one in which the income objective has the highest 
priority and one in which, beside the income objective, supply 
control is paramount. The first group is discussed in Chapter 2, 
which reviews successively the present price policy, a system of 
deficiency payments, a system of income subsidies per hectare or 
per animal employed and finally a system of direct income payments 
to farmers. Chapter 3 discusses the second group with which 
restricting us to three forms of quota arrangements, all in com-
bination with some form of price support. We consider successively 
an arrangement under which the present price guarantee system is 
limited to an EC-wide production quota, an arrangement under which 
this system is applied for quotas awarded to individual farm firms, 
and finally an arrangement under which the price guarantee system 
is replaced by a system of deficiency payments for quotas awarded 
per farm firm. 
Maintenance of present income levels as starting point 
The starting point for comparing the alternative policies 
was that agricultural income levels would be the same in each case 
as under the present price policy. In this way the alternative 
policies are accordingly made entirely comparable in respect of 
the extent to which they achieve the main objective of the agri-
cultural policy. In Chapter 2 equal income levels are ensured by 
fixing requirements in respect of the level of the price or income 
subsidy, and in Chapter 3 by observing what occurs when the loss 
of income resulting from the quota arrangements is offset by an 
increase in prices within the quota. 
There is accordingly no difference between the alternative 
policies in respect of their effects on the level of incomes'but 
there may be differences in income distribution within agriculture. 
This is dealt with separately. 
The economic effects examined 
The choice of other economic effects used as a basis for 
comparing the alternative policies with one another is partly 
based on the objectives stated in the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community and partly on a general condition with 
regard to the execution of the policy. In connection with the 
general objectives of the Treaty (Article 2), consideration is 
given to the social costs of the policy, the effects on the na-
tional income and the influence on the regional distribution of 
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production and income within the Community. The effects on the 
level of consumer prices and expenditure and the extent of pro-
duction and demand (degree of self sufficiency) are examined with 
regard to their relationship with some of the objectives of the 
agricultural policy set out in Article 39 of the Treaty. The ob-
jectives given in Article 110 in respect of international trade 
require analysis of the effects of the policy on trade with non-
member countries. Attention is finally given to the impact of the 
policy on the level of government expenditure, since this level 
is an important basic condition for executing the policy. 
Price stability and price support 
The analysis starts from the principle that the alternative 
policies do not differ in respect of achieving the objective of 
stabilizing markets expressed in Article 39 of the Treaty. It is 
assumed that this stabilization, which we interpret as the reali-
sation of price stability in the short term, is achieved with all 
the alternatives in the same way as under the present price poli-
cy. This means that it is always assumed that, regardless of the 
desired market price, a policy of price stabilization is followed 
which, by means of variable levies and subsidies at the frontier 
(together, if necessary, with intervention arrangements on the 
internal market) insulates the level of producer and consumer 
prices in the EC from fluctuations on the world market or from 
those which result from irregularities in internal supplies. 
The present price policy is accordingly broken down into two 
parts: a policy of price stabilization, which aims at keeping the 
price level and, accordingly, producers incomes and consumers' 
expenditure - regardless of level - as far as possible constant, 
and a price support policy intended to maintain the level of agri-
cultural incomes. The report is largely concerned with the second 
part. The policy of price stabilization is discussed only in 
Chapter 4, where the external effects of the common agricultural 
policy are dealt with. 
To emphasize that this report is primarily concerned with the 
support aspect of the price and income policy, the expressions 
price support and income support rather than the terms price poli-
cy and income policy are frequently used. 
Improvements in productivity 
Another main objective of the common agricultural policy laid 
down in Article 39 of the Treaty is that of increasing agricultu-
ral productivity. It is assumed in the report that in general im-
provements in productivity or in efficiency are not dependent on 
the way in which the price and income policy is pursued. This as-
sumption seems justified since it was earlier assumed that, for 
each of the alternative policies to be introduced, the farmgate 
price (at whatever level) is stable and the level of income in 
agriculture is, on average, similar. These two conditions, occur-
ring under all alternatives, have a substantial influence on the 
speed at which technological innovation can be applied in agricul-
ture and accordingly on the improvement of agricultural producti-
vity. 
The productivity assumption holds good in all cases except 
one, namely that in which attribution of fixed production quotas 
interferes with regional•specialization within the EC or tends to 
ossify production structures. 
World market prices 
In order to assess the social costs and government expendi-
ture involved in a policy, an assumption must be made as to the 
world market prices. In the first instance, it is assumed that the 
world market price for agricultural products as far as relevant 
for the EC is independent of developments in European agriculture. 
Any required quantity of agricultural produce can accordingly be 
purchased or sold by the EC without influencing the world price 
level. In this connection it is further assumed that intervention 
policy merely serves to bridge differences in space and time be-
tween production and consumption which occur within the year on 
the internal market. Over the years, no intervention stocks accu-
mulate except this is a specific aim of an active stocking policy. 
At the end of this report, the consequences of discarding 
the assumption of independent world market prices are examined 
and it is found that the EC price and income support generally 
tends to a lower world market price, than in a situation without 
that support. 
This finding is not only significant for assessing the social 
costs and government expenditure involved in the alternative poli-
cies, but also for determining the extent of income transfer be-
tween producers and consumers (and thereby taxpayers). We emphasi-
ze that, when measuring these income transfers, one must only use 
world market price levels adjusted to eliminate the world price-
lowering effect of the EC policy. The normalized and stabilized 
world market prices given in Chapters 2 and 3 are assumed to com-
ply with that requirement, whereas present-day world market pri-
ces do not in fact so comply and to refer to them results in over-
estimating the price and income support granted to agriculture in 
the EC. 
Administrative costs 
It was stated earlier in this section that the alternative 
policies are also compared in respect of their effects on the 
government's budget and consumers' expenditure. Income redistri-
bution through the market is financed mainly by the consumers; 
income redistribution via subsidies charges the Treasury and hence 
the taxpayers. 
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With regard to these effects, the report merely studies in 
which cases which type of income redistribution takes place. With 
respect to the social costs of any of the alternatives, no account 
is taken of the administrative cost of transfer nor of differences 
in cost resulting from differences in the ease with which costs 
can be passed on, in the possibilities of fraud, etc., and in the 
costs of control on these matters. It is, however, broadly stated 
in the report in what cases difficulties in implementations arise 
and of what type these difficulties are. The social costs which 
may occur under various forms of income transfer are also discus-
sed. 
Regional aspects 
Perhaps the most significant point in decision-making within 
the EC is the extent to which the individual Member States stand 
to gain or lose from alternative policies. Professor De Hoogh's 
article in the 1975 AERI Annual Report covered the significance 
of the present EC agricultural policy for the Netherlands. It 
would be beyond the scope of a study on the influence of alterna-
tive policies on the EC economy and EC agriculture as a whole to 
give extensive attention to the consequences for the individual 
Member States. The report accordingly merely points out differen-
ces in effects between the various alternatives with regard to 
regional distribution of production and income. Separate indivi-
dual studies are required for analysis of the consequences for 
individual Member States. 
No political conclusions 
The above shows that the report is largely confined to ana-
lysis of the economic effects of alternative policies for the 
Community as a whole. Because of this limitation and because of 
the impossibility of evaluating on the basis of objective criteria, 
economic effects of alternative policies,no preference is expres-
sed in the report for any one alternative. 
Even after supplementary economic investigation it would be 
impossible for a research institute like the AERI to make judge-
ments of this kind. For this purpose a political assessment of 
economic and other considerations is necessary. Such an assess-
ment would rest, for example, on matters of technical and admini-
strative feasability and social desirability, as well as on the 
question of relative advantage and disadvantage for individual 
Member States and whether agricultural incomes should be supported 
through the market or, in part, through government subsidies. 
The object of this study is simply to provide a contribution 
for discussion prior to any decision on the future arrangement 
of the agricultural policy. 
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1.2 Alternative forms of income policy without direct 
supply control 
Chapter 2 considers four alternative policies intended mainly 
to achieve the agricultural income objective. Besides the present 
type of income policy through price policy, we discuss systems of 
deficiency payments (price subsidies per unit of output), factor-
related income subsidies (of two kinds, subsidies per hectare of 
land and subsidies per animal) and direct income payments to far-
mers . For each alternative the mechanism by which the subsidy is 
granted and the effect it has are studied. In order to detect the 
effects, the situation under the alternative policy is in each case 
compared with the situation without any form of income support. Compari-
sons are also made amongst the alternative policies studied. 
A summary of the alternative policies discussed and their ef-
fects is given in Annex 1 to this report. The main conclusions are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
Volume of production and consumption of supported and non-supported 
products 
The type of policy chosen within the EC results in a price increase 
for products subject to a market organization. The result for producers 
is an increase in the marginal revenue per unit of output, which makes it 
profitable to increase production on short term by employing more varia-
ble inputs.Besides this type of income support results in maintenance 
of fixed production resources in agriculture which would other-
wise be reallocated. This also has, in the long term, the effect 
of increasing production. 
The variable and fixed production resources originate partly 
from non-agrarian sectors or from overseas and a further propor-
tion comes from types of agricultural production which are not 
subject to support. Therefore income support also influences the 
volume of outputs of unsupported products as well. 
From the consumer's point of view an increase of farm gate 
prices means higher costs of consumption. This results in a fall 
in demand for the supported product and partial substitution of it 
by unsupported products. In this way too, then, price support af-
fects supported as well as unsupported products. 
General subsidies per hectare, i.e. subsidies based on the 
whole acreage and not on special crops, and direct income pay-
ments to farmers do not have any direct effect on the level of 
prices of agricultural products either on the demand or supply 
side. They accordingly also cause no change in marginal costs and 
revenues and thus no change in the volume or composition of pro-
duction and consumption. But here too income support does affect 
the use of fixed inputs (labour and machinery and buildings) and 
thus, in the longer term, the volume of production. The subsidies 
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are therefore not neutral with respect to production. However, 
since there are no price distortions, there are no shifts from one 
product to another. The volume of productions of all agricultural 
products,and not only of those subject to a market organization, 
increases. But the output boosting effect is much less powerful 
than under the present system of price support. 
Deficiency payments and crop-related income subsidies per 
hectare or per animal occupy an intermediate position. In this 
case, as in the case of overall subsidies, demand is unaffected: 
the price relationships for consumers remain unchanged compared 
with the situation in which no income policy is followed, but 
there are significant effects on the production side. Deficiency 
payments result in the same increase in marginal revenue of final 
products and accordingly in the same effects on production and 
substitution as the present price policy. Crop-related income sub-
sidies per hectare or per animal make it attractive to increase 
the use of the subsidized inputs which give rise to an increase 
of the volume of production. The extent of this increase and the 
extent to which it takes place at the expense of unsupported pro-
ducts will vary. On the whole, deficiency payments lead to the 
largest production increase in supported products and crop-rela-
ted income subsidies result in the largest switches from unsuppor-
ted to supported crops. 
Social costs 
Agricultural income support involves relatively the highest 
social costs when the arrangement entails an increase of the in-
ternal market price for agricultural products above the world 
market price (as takes place in practice in the EC at present). 
These social costs, which should be distinguished from the much 
higher income transfers, consist of: 
1. the cost of the extra input of resources (both within and 
outside agriculture) caused by the higher general level of 
prices in agriculture less the resultant increase in produc-
tion; 
2. the loss in consumer's surplus caused by the increase in 
the average price of foodstuffs less the extra income ac-
cruing to producers; 
3. the loss of utility resulting from the socially and economi-
cally inappropriate changes in the pattern of production and 
consumption (and thereby also that of import and export) of 
agricultural products, to the extent that the price policy 
distorts the domestic price relationships between alternative 
products to a significant extent compared with international 
price relationships. 
The cost factors called under (1) and (2) are relatively in-
significant in view of the fairly low price elasticity both of the 
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total supply in agriculture and the total consumption of agri-
cultural produce. Cost factor (3) may, depending on the extent to 
which price relationships are distorted (for example, between 
grain and other feeding 'stuffs), be more significant. 
In times of unemployment the social costs are lower than in 
times of full employment, since the opportunity costs of the ad-
ditional inputs in agriculture are lower. 
Of these social costs, only factors (1) and (3) are expressed 
in a change in the EC's gross national product; by definition, 
change in the consumer's surplus has no influence 1). 
This analysis ignores any costs resulting from income 
redistribution through the goverment budget (e.g. the costs 
of prevention of urgent public expenditure because the authorities 
are reluctant to impose further increases in taxation). 
The social costs of deficiency payments or crop-related in-
come subsidies per hectare or per animal are lower than those of 
the present price policy, particularly when these subsidies are 
financed through progressive taxation. Since consumer prices are 
unaffected, no loss of consumer's surplus takes place in this way. 
Furthermore, there is no distortion of the relationships between 
consumer prices and this avoids a switch in products consumed 
(e.g. in the compound feeding stuffs industry), which would be 
inappropriate from the point of view of social costs. 
One difference between crop-related subsidies per hectare and 
deficiency payments is that the former on the production side as 
well involve less social costs than the present policy, whereas 
the latter do not. In the case of subsidies per hectare, there 
is no increase in the marginal revenue and this .means lower use of 
variable inputs. There is, however, a greater tendency to change 
the use of land from unsupported to supported crops. This further 
change does not take place, indeed, if the subsidies are based on 
the lowering of the difference between gross revenue and variable 
costs and not only on the lowering of gross revenue as a con-
sequence of the price reduction. 
General subsidies per hectare and direct income payments to 
farmers are from a social point of view even less costly since 
in such cases shifts in the composition of production which are 
undesirable from the consumer's and producer's point of view, do 
not occur, but the encouragement to retain labour and capital in 
agriculture results under this system, as under all other types of 
income support, in extra social costs. 
I) The costs of agricultural policy are often taken to cover the 
effects of that policy on the EC's gross national product. These 
costs are called national economic costs. This paper employs the 
expression social costs, which means that the costs of agricultu-
ral policy include both national economic costs and the loss of con-
sumer's surplus. 
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Distribution of income within agriculture 
Income transfers through product prices (by means of market 
regulation or deficiency payments) are irrevocably dependent on 
the quantity a farmer produces. 
Systems of subsidies per hectare or direct income payments 
make it possible to support incomes by other criteria and accor-
dingly to run a more differentiated income policy. However, the 
adoption of criteria (e.g. with regard to size of farm, type of 
farm, region and perhaps even income level) means that practical 
application is entirely dependent on a suitable administration. 
For this reason, the introduction of a system of direct income 
payments to farmers in particular seems to be practically impossi-
ble in the EC. 
The higher prices for agricultural products entailed by the 
present price policy mean higher costs for stock-farmers owing to 
an increase in the price of feed. Initially this results in a 
redistribution of income from these livestock producers towards 
the farmings•growing the feed, but ultimately the compensatory 
levies on livestock products pass on the cost of income redistri-
bution to the consumer. If the stock-farmer switches from products 
subject to a market organization to other feeding stuffs, there may 
even be over-compensation of the cost disadvantage. 
Distribution of the burden between the government budget and the 
consumers 
The manner in which income transfers to agriculture are fi-
nanced depends closely on the instruments of income policy em-
ployed. 
The present system is far and away the most advantageous in 
budget terms, since the costs of the policy are borne by consu-
mers through increased internal market prices. The government bud-
get is involved only if and insofar as internal consumption (at 
set prices) differs from internal supply. If the degree of self-
sufficiency in a product falls short of 100%, producers and go-
vernment both "profit" at the consumer's expense. If the self-
sufficiency level for a product exceeds 100%, redistribution is 
partly at the government's "expense". 
Any other form of income redistribution involves very heavy 
expenditure for the government, since in that case the total trans-
fer of income to agriculture must go through the budget. There is 
no burden on consumers, not at any rate through prices. This ul-
timately means that the income redistribution from other sectors 
to agriculture depends on the tax structure rather than on the 
rate of consumption of agricultural produce. 
Trade with non-member countries 
Stimulation of production and the decline in consumption 
cause under the present price policy, compared with others forms 
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of incomes support, the greatest drop in the EC's import require-
ment (or the largest increase in its export surplus). For non-
member countries, this ceteris paribus means reduced outlets on 
the EC market and a greater (subsidized) supply from the EC on 
world markets. Furthermore, the variable import levies applied 
under this system represent an additional administrative obstacle 
to access to the EC. 
This negative effect of the increased degree of self-suffi-
ciency on non-member countries' agricultural trade with the EC is 
more or less compensated if and to the extent that the extra use 
of resources in agriculture entails an increased import require-
ment (or smaller supply for export) of goods and services in other 
economic sectors. The regional pattern of the EC's external trade 
(including relationships with poor and rich countries) is influen-
ced in this way, but it is difficult to discern quite how. 
As a consequence of distortions in price relationships and 
the resultant substitution in production and consumption of agri-
cultural products, the composition of the reduced imports of 
agricultural products too (including feeding stuffs) is signifi-
cantly altered and this leads probably to a substantial change in 
the distribution of imports according to region of origin. 
Since there is practically no impact on consumption and very 
little on production, general subsidies per hectare and direct in-
come payments to farmers would have a much smaller influence on 
the EC's agricultural trade with non-member countries. 
Deficiency payments, subsidies per hectare for specific crops 
and income subsidies per animal are in an intermediate position. 
The effect on trade with non-member countries is almost exclusi-
vely a result of alterations in the volume and composition of EC 
production. 
Regional distribution of production and income in the EC; moneta-
ry compensatory amounts 
Common prices are an indispensable condition for achieving 
an optimum regional distribution of production within the EC. In 
theory, this condition can be met under all the alternative poli-
cies examined, but in practice there are differences. 
The present price policy gives support to a limited number 
of products. The resultant alterations in price patterns cause 
producers of livestock products, who employ agricultural produce 
as feed, to alter the composition of that feed. The products sub-
ject to a market organization, which rise in price, are substi-
tuted by products, which remain cheaper as they do not fall under 
a market organization. If this substitution also results in raw 
materials of EC origin being replaced by those imported from non-
member countries, alterations in the transport cost ratios for 
farmers in areas near the EC's import harbours (Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Brittany, North Italy) can give them a competitive advantage 
over farmers in more inland situated areas. 
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Such a relative competitive advantage hardly occurs under a 
system of deficiency payments since consumer prices do not then 
change; yet regional changes in production do take place under a 
deficiency payments system just as they do under the present poli-
cy. Producers in regions with the highest production per unit of 
input moreover receive relatively the highest income support. 
Factor-related income subsidies do not provide the extra 
incentive to concentrate production in areas with the largest pro-
duction per unit of input and in the case of direct income pay-
ments to farmers, there may even be, depending on the criteria 
for their grant, a relative disadvantage for areas with good con-
ditions for production. 
The differences discussed above in effect on the distribution 
of income between consumers, government and producers mean that 
the alternative policies differ at the same time in respect of the 
distribution of benefits and burdens among the Member States of 
the EC. The most significant difference is that under the present 
policy the greatest burdens are borne by countries with the 
highest per capita consumption of foodstuffs, whereas in the case 
of deficiency payments and different kinds of income subsidies 
these burdens are mainly borne by countries with the highest per 
capita national income. 
The alternative policies all make it possible to replace the 
under the present policy existing system of monetary compensatory 
amounts by producer subsidies differentiated by Member State. This 
would eliminate the internal price distortions in the EC but there 
seems to be a real danger that such subsidies, like the MCA's, 
would give the Member States too much scope for running a national 
policy. Financing would also remain a point of dispute. 
Employment and land utilization in agriculture 
This report pays practically no attention to the effects of 
the alternative policies studied on employment and land utiliza-
tion in agriculture. In principle, these effects should not differ 
greatly from one policy to another. With regard to employment, the 
number employed in agriculture depends in the first place on the 
ratio between incomes per worker inside and outside agriculture 
and on the employment situation outside. All the alternatives 
presuppose the same income level in agriculture. The differences 
in effect on employment in agriculture are accordingly almost en-
tirely connected with differences in income distribution. The 
level of employment is higher under all alternatives than in a 
situation without any form of income support 1). 
1) Apart from differences iff employment in agriculture, the alternati-
ve policies may differ with regard to the creation of employment 
in the supplying and processing sec-tors. Thèse result from altera-
tions in the demand for inputs and agricultural outputs. It is, 
however, not easy to assess the scale of these differences. 
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Apart from independent non-agricultural demand, there are 
practically no alternative uses for land. If we ignore any cost 
of inputs complementairy to the input of agricultural land, which 
could have been used elsewhere, then there are practically no so-
cial costs in use of land for agriculture. Apart from temporary 
withdrawal of land from use in order to avoid surpluses, reduction 
in the use of this.production factor is not really profitable 0. 
Increase in the area is impossible since practically all available 
land is already cultivated in the EC. 
These conclusions are equally true for all alternative poli-
cies. 
1.3 Alternative forms of income policy with direct sup-
ply control: quota arrangements 
Three forms of quota systems are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Their object is to control the supply of agricultural produce. 
After a brief discussion of the concept of market balance, atten-
tion is successively paid to price guarantees for an EC-wide pro-
duction quota (also called mixed price system, with the co-res-
ponsibility levy as variant), price guarantees for quotas awarded 
to individual farm firms, and finally to deficiency payments for 
quotas allocated per farm firm. Two situations are distinguished 
for each of these three quota systems, one where the level of 
price support for the quota quantity is the same as under the pre-
sent policy without quotas, and one where the drop in agricultural 
income resulting from the quota system is offset by an increase in 
prices for the quantities produced within the quota. 
In Annex 2 to this report, graphs summarize the similarities 
and differences between these three quota systems and the forms of 
price support discussed in Chapter 2 (given the same income trans-
fer to agriculture and the same supply elasticity of supply for 
each producer). In Annex 3 - solely for the purpose of illustra-
tion - these similatities and differences are expressed in quanti-
tative terms. 
Volume of production and consumption; market balance 
Where the price guarantee is restricted to a specific quota 
while the price level remains the same, the producer generally 
suffers a drop in marginal revenue when this quota is exceeded. 
This applies to all quota systems. With a mixed price system, how-
ever, this drop is much smaller than where the quotas are awarded 
1) Reduction in the use of land for agriculture could even be so-
cially undesirable if this were to lead in an increase in im-
ports of feeding stuffs or other agricultural products. 
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per farm. In the first case the overall drop in revenue is appor-
tioned among all the units produced by all the producers. The 
marginal revenue per unit remains constant and the same as the 
mixed price. Where the quotas are awarded per farm, the individual 
producer receives the full price support for his units produced 
within the quota, and the effects of exceeding the quota are felt 
exclusively by the last units produced. Marginal revenue is thus 
not constant but falls sharply at the point where production ex-
ceeds the quota. The result is that where the quotas are awarded 
per farm, the amount produced in excess of the quota is much smal-
ler than under a mixed price system. The system of fixing the 
quotas per farm is a more effective instrument for controlling 
production therefore, since the individual farmer receives a 
clearer price signal than with a mixed price system. 
In practice, even with a system of quotas per farm, the quota 
for the whole of the EC can be exceeded. This is the result of 
differences in marginal cost curves (i.e. differences in elastici-
ty of supply) from one producer to another. A producer with a rela-
tively steep marginal cost curve will be more inclined to exceed 
the quota assigned to him than a producer whose curve is relati-
vely flat. 
It was demonstrated in the foregoing paragraph that govern-
ment-financed income support lead to a higher level of consumption 
than market price guarantees do. This is also the case where both 
forms of price support are applied in conjunction with a quota 
system. It follows that a combination of deficiency payments and 
quotas per farm firm is the most effective means of promoting mar-
ket balance: supply is restricted and demand remains at the level 
it would have reached without any form of price support. Less 
effective is a system of price guarantees for the quotas per farm 
firm: supply is restricted but demand feels the full effect of the 
price support. Lastly, a mixed price system contributes only very 
slightly to the achievement of market balance: supply is hardly 
restricted at all and demand is at the same level as with price 
guarantees for the quotas per farm. Where the price level is 
raised under a mixed price system - to offset the loss in agricul-
tural income - there is even a loss of market balance: supply is 
not restricted and the increase in prices curbs demand further. 
The level of agricultural incomes 
Restricting the price guarantee to a specific quota causes 
revenue to farmers to fall . The reasons are a drop in production 
and a fall in revenue per unit for units produced in excess of the 
quota. 
Lower production means not only less revenue but also lower 
costs: the resulting reduction in income is thus smaller than the 
reduction in revenue. The fall in revenue for the quantity produ-
ced in excess of the quota is not offset by a fall in costs: in 
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this case, therefore, the reduction in income is equal to the 
reduction in revenue. 
It has already been shown that the mixed price system results 
in the production quota being exceeded to a greater extent than 
does a system of quotas per farm. This means that where the price 
level remains the same a smaller proportion of the decrease in 
revenue is offset by a decrease in costs. It follows that the in-
troduction of a mixed price system results, where the price level 
stays the same, in a greater loss of income for agriculture than 
the introduction of a system of quotas per farm. There is no dif-
ference in this respect between quota systems with price guaran-
tees and those with deficiency payments. 
If the reduction in income is to be avoided, it is necessary 
to have a greater price increase for the units produced within the 
quota under a mixed price system than under a system of quotas per 
farm. In addition, under a mixed price system this price increase 
completely cancels out the effect of quotas. Furthermore, although 
the result of the increase under a system of quotas per farm is to 
restore the old income level, the income distribution is changed. 
Farms whose price elasticity of supply is relatively high, are 
overcompensated, while farms whose price elasticity of supply is 
relatively low are undercompensated. Differential price supple-
ments could prevent this, but they on its turn present problems 
with regard to government financing and administrative feasibility. 
Social costs 
Because of the smaller input of resources and the reduced 
price distorsions on the supply side, a price guarantee for the 
quotas per farm results in lower social costs than the present price 
policy or a mixed price system. This cost advantage on the supply 
side is not affected by increasing the level of the guaranteed 
price for the quantity within the quota. Such an income support 
measure still gives rise to increased costs on the demand side, 
but to a lesser extent than with a mixed price system because the 
price rises by a smaller amount. 
A system of deficiency payments for quotas per farm results 
in the lowest social costs , leaving out of account any costs' 
arising from the redistribution of incomes via the government bud-
get. Theoretically, the quota could be fixed so that there were 
no costs either on the demand side or the supply side. In practice, 
social costs arise on the supply side here too as a result of the 
abovementioned differences in individual marginal cost curves. 
Charges for the government budget and for consumers 
As long as the price level remains constant it makes no dif-
ference to consumers whether the present price policy is supple-
mented or not by quota systems. However, where the introduction 
of a quota system leads to price increases to offset the loss of 
income in agriculture, the charges for consumers are greater than 
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under the present policy. The mixed price system then gives rise 
to the highest charges. 
For the government budget, at all events, the charges are 
reduced as compared with a policy of no quotas. Naturally, even 
with a quota system the budgetary charges are much greater in 
respect of a system of deficiency paymets than under a price 
guarantee policy. 
Trade with non-member countries 
A system of deficiency payments with quotas per farm is the 
most attractive from the point of view of sales by non-member 
countries. The demand from consumers in the EC is the same as 
without any kind of price support and, although the competing 
supply from EC producers is higher than where there is no support, 
it is lower than where there is a price support policy without 
quotas. 
A price guarantee system with quotas per farm is more attrac-
tive to non-member countries than the present price policy because 
EC production is lower; there are no advantages on the demand 
side. A mixed price system has no advantage for non-member coun-
tries and even entails a disadvantage by reducing demand in the 
EC when price increases occur to make up producers' incomes. 
Implementation 
Of the three types of system, a mixed price system is tech-
nically and administratively the easiest to implement. The other 
two systems can raise more problems. The nature of these problems 
varies depending on the product. For products such as cereals and 
sugar, for instance, it is difficult to find a sound basis for 
apportioning the quota, as yields per hectare can fluctuate consi-
derably from year to year because of the weather and the area sown 
fluctuates because of the extensive posibilities for substitution 
in the arable sector. For milk, these problems are not so great 
because yields per cow are much less dependent on the weather and 
there are fewer possibilities for substitution in the dairy sec-
tor. Milk, however, has the disadvantage compared with, say, sugar 
that monitoring the quota involves far more enterprises (both 
farms and processing enterprises). Where a price guarantee system 
with quotas per farm is applied, it is also more difficult with 
milk than with sugar to prevent quantities produced in excess of 
the quota from being marketed by bypassing the normal channels: 
milk can be sold directly to consumers, sugarbeet can not. This 
problem of market separation does not arise under a system of 
deficiency payments with quotas per farm, because there is no 
difference in consumer prices between quantities produced within 
and above the quota. 
The abovementioned administrative problems and possibilities 
are meant only as an illustration. An exhaustive enumeration in 
respect of specific products is outside the scope of this report 
and calls for further study. 
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Farm structure and regional distribution of production 
Quota systems can in the long term give rise to appreciable 
social costs where their fixing by farm or by Member State impedes 
the development of farm structure and the regional distribution 
of production in the EC. The quotas must therefore either be trans-
ferable or else reallocated at regular intervals, for instance 
every year (in the'latter case perhaps on the basis of the total 
quantities produced in previous years, and not only those produced 
within the quota). 
In the case of a mixed price system or a system of quotas 
per farm, it will probably be difficult to avoid apportioning 
quotas per Member State, as is the case now with sugar. The quota 
would then be valid for a lengthy period and not transferable be-
tween Member States. In addition, there would be problems in 
finding a basis for the initial apportionment of the Member Sta-
tes' quotas after the introduction of such a system. 
Making quotas transferable could result in their fetching a 
price which led to a redistribution of income and capital between 
holders and non-holders. Furthermore, it is probable that in the 
long run the costs of acquiring quotas will be included in the 
costs of agricultural production and that this will lead to an in-
crease in price support. 
The conclusion, is that quotas per farm are an attractive pro-
position for the EC economy and EC agriculture as a whole; how-
ever, certain conditions must be met and this raises a number of 
problems. 
1.4 The influence of EC policy on the world market 
prices of agricultural produce 
In the foregoing it has been assumed that the world market 
prices of agricultural produce are independent of the policy fol-
lowed in the EC. Chapter 4 contains some remarks on the consequen-
ces for the EC and for world markets of abandoning this assumption. 
With dependent world market prices the influence of the pre-
sent price policy on government expenditure and social costs 
would be different from the description given in Chapter 2. The 
price policy leads to a reduced need for imports to or an in-
creased surplus for exports from the EC, which tends to depress 
world market prices. With a degree of self-sufficiency of less 
than 100% this means an increase in government revenue because im-
port levies rise by the same amount by which world market prices 
fall. This is detrimental to the foreign currency earnings of non-
member countries and gives the EC a social benefit. With a self-
sufficiency rate of more than 100% a fall in world market prices 
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leads via higher export refunds to increased government expenditu-
re and social costs. The EC suffers a drop in export earnings. 
The same conclusion can be drawn in respect of all forms of 
price and income support mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3 which lead 
to a reduced need for imports or a larger surplus for exports. 
The point where advantages become disadvantages is always at a 
self-sufficiency rate of 100%. With quota systems, the disadvan-
tage of an increased surplus for export is borne wholly or in part 
by producers. 
Annex 3 illustrates these effects on government expenditure, 
agricultural incomes and social costs in situations of independent 
and dependent world market prices. 
The influence of EC policy on world market prices can make it 
more attractive, from the point of view of minimalizing govern-
ment expenditure and social costs, to take a part of production 
into intervention rather than sell it to non-member countries. In 
this way, intervention can save public funds. 
Whether the intervention stocks thus formed, which are not 
saleable commercially, are disposed off with the aid of subsidies 
inside or outside the EC depends on the possibilities for market 
separation and on the corresponding price elasticities. If these 
elasticities are equal, sale within the Community is preferable 
from the point of view of social costs. 
Chapter 4 concludes with an examination of the influence of 
the EC mechanism of variable levies and refunds on the stability 
of prices on world markets. It is argued that this mechanism -
which helps to achieve stability on the internal markets - in-
creases price instability on world markets.. The fact that the 
levies and refunds are variable means that the world market can 
no longer benefit from the increased absorptive capacity of con-
sumers in the EC, while the fluctuations in production within the 
Community must be absorbed elsewhere. 
The mechanism of intervention on the internal market can be 
seen as a first attempt to lessen these disadvantages of EC policy 
for the world markets. 
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2. A l t e rna t i ve f o rms of i ncome pol icy 
w i t h o u t d i r e c t supply c o n t r o l 
2.1 P r e s e n t p r i c e p o l i c y 
Mechanism 
The present Community price policy is designed to secure a 
reasonable level of agricultural income through support of the 
market prices for various farm products. Price support has meant 
that,as a rule, the price of these products are higher, both at 
the farm gate and for consumers, than equivalent world market pri-
ces. The price support system uses levies and refunds to esta-
blish minimum price levels for imports and exports of agricultural 
produce. If there are irregularities in internal supply owing to 
an absence of outlets in non-member countries, and the measures 
taken at the frontier prove ineffective as a result, these are 
then supplemented by intervention on the internal market. 1) 
Effects on production, consumption and income 
The theoretical effects of the present price policy for a 
specific product are shown in figure 1. Figure la gives the situa-
tion for a product where the EC is a net importer and figure lb is 
for a product where the EC is a net exporter. 2) 
Figure I. Effects of the present price policy 
b) with net exports 
1) The Institute's publication 1.15 contains a full description of 
the present price-support mechanism (Doeleinden, instrumenten 
en effecten van het huidige landbouwbeleid in de EG -Objectives, 
policy instruments and effects of the present EC agricultural 
policy). 
2) Figures 1 to 5 are also given in a slightly different form all 
together on the same page in annex 2 in order to make it easier to 
compare the various price support systems discussed in this report 
with one another. 
24 
Support of the market price Ppf, at a level above the world 
market price P., causes demand, at given elasticities of supply and 
demand, for the product in question to fall from q? to q^, and 
supply to increase from q^ to q., thus giving a greater degree of 
self-sufficiency. The consequences of this are expressed in the 
triangular and rectangular areas designated by the capital letters. 
An increase in the price and the quantity produced above the 
level that would be reached without any form of support brings an 
increase in revenue for the agricultural producers.in question of 
A+G+B+E in the net import situation and of A'+D'+D+C'+G+B+E in the 
net export situation. In both cases these are offset by increased 
costs resulting from greater use of resources owing to the growth 
in output. Assuming that the supply curve is equal to the marginal 
cost curve this cost increase is equal to B+E. The result is an 
increase in income for the producers which in the net import si-
tuation is equal to A+G and in the net export situation is equal 
to A'+D'+D+C'+G. 
The result of price support for the consumers is that expen-
diture in the net import situation increases by A+G+B+C-F and in 
the net export situation by A'-F. Consumers also suffer loss of 
utility (or welfare) through the fall in consumption of the suppor-
ted product. Assuming that the demand curve is equal to the mar-
ginal utility curve (or for the processing sectors the marginal 
revenue curve) this utility loss is equal to D+F. The total loss 
for consumers is therefore A+G+B+C+D for net import and A'+D for 
net export. For consumers this is equivalent to the loss of con-
sumer's surplus and for the processors it represents lost income. 
For the treasury price support results in the receiving of 
a levy amounting to V„c minus E, for the net quantity imported. 
C represents the revenue from this levy. In the situation of net 
export refunds must be paid and the consequent expenditure is 
D'+D+C'+G+B. 
Social costs and income distribution 
The result so far as producers, consumers and the official 
budget are concerned is that whenever the EC price level is higher 
than world market prices, income is redistributed from the consu-
mer to the producer. With net imports, income is also redistri-
buted from the consumer to the budget and with net exports from 
the budget to the producer. 1) 
1) Since at this point world market prices are assumed to be in-
dependent we shall disregard official expenditure on surplus 
stocks for purposes of intervention. Intervention expenditure 
which merely serves to bridge differences in space and time 
between production and consumption need not be taken into ac-
count because it is assumed that this kind of stabilisation po-
licy would also be followed in a situation where no price support was 
given. 
25 
The overall result for producers, the budget and consumers 
of the income and utility changes is equal to -(B+D) 1) both in 
the net import and net export situation. The redistribution of in-
come therefore entails on balance a net loss of income or utility 
to the EC economy. This loss represents (in times of full employ-
ment) the social costs of the policy governing the product in 
question.2) 
Part D of this loss .consists of the utility foregone as a re-
sult of internal consumption moving from q0 to q'j'. This represents 
the loss of income due to reduced internal sales in subsequent 
economic sectors resulting from shifts in production in agricul-
ture and the loss of utility suffered by consumers. National in-
come experiences a loss because of the ensuing shifts of produc-
tion but is not affected by the loss of consumer utility. However, 
the total loss D must be included in the social costs of the policy. 
Part B of the social charges relates to the production side 
of the model and in times of full employment finds expression in 
its entirety in the national income. B represents the difference 
in costs incurred as a result of increased agricultural production 
(B+E) and the savings in imports and additional value of exports 
respectively derived from this increased production (E). With full 
employment the decline in output in other sectors because the 
resources are switched to agriculture and the costs of increased 
imports go to make up the additional production costs. In times of 
unemployment these costs are lower in economic terms. Here too, 
however, costs are always .incurred because any expansion of pro-
duction is in fact coupled with additional calls on resources 
such as fossil fuels, which, unlike labour, are in scarce supply. 
In this case the economic revenue from the additional agricultural 
production amounts to E, this being the world market price multi-
plied by the additional quantity produced (qj-q^). 
We may therefore conclude that the total effect on the natio-
nal income of the present prices policy is, with full employment, 
at least -B less part of D, and, with unemployment, is at most +E 
less part of D. The social effect of price support is therefore 
greater than the national income effect. The difference between 
the two comprises the consumer utility effect, which by definition 
is reflected in the social costs but not in the national income. 
1) For net import: (A+G)+(C)-(A+G+B+C+D) = -(B+D); 
for net export: (AI+D'+D+C'+G)-(D'+D+CI+G+B)-(A'+D) = -(B+D). 
2) Here (and in sections 3.2 and 3.3) we are not concerned with 
the social effects that accompany income transfers to or from 
the central budget (taxation, subsidies, etc.). These amount to 
relatively little in this section. In sections 2.2 to 2.4 and 
3.4, where much larger public income transfers are involved 
than are encountered at present we shall be looking at their 
social effects. 
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Agricultural policy is primarily a policy of income redistribution 
The size of areas B, D and E is determined by the long-term 
price elasticities of demand and supply for the supported product 
and by the amount of price support given. Without attempting to 
measure effects in quantitative terms we can establish that 
triangles B and D are smaller in every case than the sum totals 
of the remaining rectangles and triangles A+G+C and A'+D'+C'+G 
respectively. This leads to the general conclusion that the social 
and economic effects of the present common agricultural policy -
and as we shall be seeing also of the alternative policies - are 
much less substantial than the income distribution effects. The 
income redistribution effects of the policy, in so far as it af-
fects consumer expenditure and the central budget, are therefore 
of much greater significance than its social costs or the national 
income effect and should therefore be viewed separately. The com-
mon agricultural policy is to a substantial degree an income re-
distribution policy. 
Effects on non-member countries 
Income is not only redistributed as between sectors and 
groups within the Community but also between the Community and 
non-member countries. The increase in production and the decline 
in consumption of agricultural products enable the EC to benefit 
from foreign currency savings of E+F at the expense, therefore, 
of non-member countries. The policy reduces non-member countries' 
trade outlets on the EC markets and this is only offset to a such 
lesser degree by increased imports of other products (agricultural 
raw materials including animal feedstuffs, non-agrarian consumer 
goods). This will be considered in greater detail when we come to 
discuss the policy's effects on unsupported products. 
Quantifying of effects; differentiations per product 
These theoretical assumptions would be much more cogent if 
it were possible to quantify the various effects. Generally speak-
ing the requisite statistics for the volume of production, con-
sumption and exports and imports are available for the individual 
products although it is more difficult to assess the actual extent 
of price support since one can only make a rough estimate of what 
the appropriate world market prices should be. The greatest diffi-
culty of all, however, lies in trying to predict the long-term 
price elasticities of supply and demand for the supported products. 
Any analysis of the impact on prices will be severely hampered by 
the substitution effect (cross-price elasticities) that frequently 
operates between the supported products and their substitutes. 
For the moment, therefore, we cannot formulate estimates based on 
actual products but what we have done is to calculate the effects 
of alternative policies on two imaginary products, using arbitrari-
ly selected price levels and price elasticities. These figures are 
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given in Annex 3 to this report and are meant to serve solely as 
illustrations. 
It has already been observed that the social costs of the 
current price policy are small in comparison to the income redis-
tribution effects. With low price elasticities of supply and 
demand, the social costs will also be relatively small in absolute 
terms. On the other hand if a policy applied to products with 
higher elasticities of demand and/or supply, this would entail 
much greater social costs. Not surprisingly, therefore, the pre-
sent policy's most stringent form of price support (target pricing); 
is still confined to such products as grain, sugar and milk which 
are market by relatively low price elasticities of supply owing 
to the fact that any rapid growth of supply in these land-related 
products would be impeded by the limited amount of land availa-
ble. 1) The demand for these products is also relatively insensi-
tive to price changes because of their substitutability. 
A stringent form of price support for products with greater price 
sensitivity, such as pigmeat, poultry, eggs and horticultural 
produce, would presumably soon trigger of a sharp increase in pro-
duction with all the adverse social effects this would entail. 
Impact on unsupported products 
The present policy also affects unsupported products. All 
these effects are expressed in theoretical form in the triangular 
and rectangular areas in figure 1. If substitution is possible in 
respect of the supply of agricultural products, supply becomes 
more elastic and triangle B and rectangle E increase in size. If 
substitution is possible on the demand side and the demand for 
agricultural products accordingly becomes more elastic, then areas 
D and F become greater. We shall examine this in greater detail. 
The B triangle is formed by the difference between the in-
creased revenue from the supported product (E) and the loss of 
revenue suffered by other products or from additional imports 
(B+E). The additional revenue could be lost from industrial pro-
duction but it could also come from agricultural production, es-
pecially if the products in question are land-related and thé land 
input can be switched from unsupported products to those in re-
ceipt of support. 
Consequently, in the EC the production of potatoes and high-
1) It is debatable whether this underlying assumption of the pre-
sent price policy does in fact apply to milk. In the Nether-
lands , where the consumption of concentrates made up from im-
ported raw materials is growing in both absolute and relative 
terms, milk production is becoming increasingly less related 
to land-usage. This has meant a higher price elasticity of sup-
ply, which, if the present price policy is adhered to, will 
lead to greater social costs. 
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protein animal feedstuffs, such as luzerne, has declined while 
production of grain and sugar has increased. The fall in potato 
production remains a limited one because this product has a low 
price-elasticity of demand and there is little international tra-
ding in potatoes. Consequently, any reduction of output is im-
mediately followed by a rise in price and it becomes relatively 
competitive again. High-protein feedstuffs, on the other hand, 
have not experienced any internal price increases because their 
prices depend largely on world market prices. Consequently there 
has been a sharp cutback in the amount of high-protein animal feed 
being cultivated in Europe, while potential new crops, such a 
soya, have been placed at such a competitive disadvantage from the 
outset that they can probably never get under way. 
One of the first substitutions that can be made as regards 
the demand for agricultural products (which in this case also in-
creases the supply of supported products) is for the stock-farmer 
to produce his own animal feed. If there is an increase in grain 
and milk prices, it then becomes more attractive for the producer 
to sell that produce than to use it for his own farm feedstuffs, 
and he will try to purchase a supply of the cheaper feedstuffs to 
satisfy his own requirements. This chain of events is demonstrated 
by the fact that less milk is being consumed on the farm where it 
is being replaced by purchased feedstuffs that are mainly'vegeta-
ble in origin and consequently a higher percentage of milk output 
is then supplied to the dairy processors. 
There will also be a move in the feedstuffs industry, where 
it is technically possible, to replace supported products with 
other low-cost raw materials which can either be imported (vir-
tually) duty-free, from non-member countries (e.g. tapioca, soya, 
citrus pulp) or possibly come from within the Community (one could 
instance, say, legumes or luzerne). This leads to higher prices 
for the unsupported domestic products and/or greater imports of 
duty-free products from non-member countries. Set against this, 
one has reduced imports and/or increased exports of price-suppor-
ted products. 
Raw materials not subject to the pricing system can also be 
substituted for supported products by the food and drink industry, 
by consumers in their shopping or by other end-users. 
In all these cases the changes in relative prices lead to 
substitution effects in the demand for agricultural products and 
thus bring about greater elasticity of demand and a flatter demand 
curve in figure 1. 
Despite the replacement of supported products by cheaper raw 
materials price support does result in a net increase in the price 
of foodstuffs and animal feed. In each case the product pattern 
chosen is bound to be less advantageous than the optimum alter-
native would be without any form of price-support. 
Indeed, in intensive livestock farming the increase in the 
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cost of animal products resulting from the higher price of feed 
is offset by levies and refunds on imports and exports of the fi-
nal product from and to non-member countries. This pushes up the 
internal price level of pigmeat, poultry and eggs and the effect 
of the higher price of animal feedstuffs raw materials is passed 
on to the consumer. 
The foregoing leads one to conclude that the present price 
policy not only influences the supported products themselves but 
also affects other agricultural products. This applies to both 
supply and demand. The extent of this influence depends on the 
amount of substitutability and on the degree which prices change 
in relation to one another. A substantial proportion of the social 
costs of the agricultural policy is determined by this relative 
substitutability. 
The substitution effects also have an impact on trade with 
non-member countries, as well as on the internal market. For 
example, support of the grain price causes grain imports to be 
replaced by imports of other - untaxed - feedstuff raw materials. 
However the eventual balance of imported feedstuffs will be lower 
than it would be if grain prices were not supported owing to the 
fall in demand referred to earlier as a result of the net increase 
in costs incurred by the producers of slaughter animals. I) 
Furthermore, the substitution of untaxed feed components for those 
that are taxed will affect the regional pattern to trading between 
the EC and non-member countries. Whether this may or may not 
eventually be to the advantage of, say, the developping countries 
is not examined in this context. 
Regional distribution of production and income in the EC 
Regional specialisation depends on there being single prices 
under the present price policy, although owing to monetary problems 
these have yet to be fully achieved. Theoretically the conditions 
for regional specialisation within the Community would also be 
created if there were uniform prices in the EC set at the world 
market price level, i.e. without any form of price support. In 
practice the latter is quite out of the question and this has' 
helped the present price policy to contribute to greater freedom 
of trade in agricultural products in the EC. In so far as this 
has actually brought about the intended regional specialisation, 
European agricultural productivity will also have increased. 
Indeed the aforementioned shift from unsupported to supported 
products in the pattern of production has resulted in there being 
a different regional production distribution than would have been 
the case if all products received the same price support. Regions 
with relative cost advantages for products other than supported 
products are now producing the supported products. 
1) There was seen to be an increase in the need to import animal 
feed components as a direct result of support being given to 
milk prices. 
30 
products are now producing the supported products. 
In intensive livestock farming the shift in demand from sup-
ported to unsupported animal feed components (together with the 
fall in output of the latter) can result in relatively higher im-
ports of raw materials from non-member countries. Because of al-
terations in transport cost ratios livestock farmers in areas 
close to the import harbours have relative cost advantages over 
farmers in EC regions further inland. This could well have a 
bearing on the fact that intensive livestock farming is concen-
traded in the Netherlands, Belgium, Brittany and Northern Italy. 
Apart from affecting regional production distribution, price 
support has also given rise to regional income distribution ef-
fects in the EC. The redistribution of income as between pro-
ducers, the budget and consumers noted earlier has in fact also 
meant a redistribution of income between the EC Member States 
whereby Member States with a low degree of self-sufficiency in the 
supported product are transferring income, via consumer prices, 
to Member States with a high degree of self-sufficiency. The 
heaviest burden is falling upon those countries with the highest 
per capita consumption. 
2.2 Deficiency payments (price subsidies per unit of 
output) 
Having described in some detail the effects of the present 
form of price support, in this and the following sections we shall 
be looking at a number of alternative methods of achieving the 
income objective using different policies from those followed 
hitherto. As in the previous section, the effects of the alter-
native policies will be explored by comparing them with situations 
in which no form of price or income support is given and the dif-
ferences in the effects of the present policy and the policy un-
der discussion will be considered. 
Mechanism 
The desired income support that a farmer derives from a par-
ticular product can also be achieved without raising the market 
price of that particular product. The gap between the actual mar-
ket price and the desired producer price can for example be brid-
ged by a payment, from the Treasury of a price subsidy per unit 
of output. This system of "deficiency payments" was operated for 
many years in the United Kingdom and is used in the EC for some 
less important products (including durum wheat, tobacco, dehydra-
ted forage and various seeds). A system entirely comparable with 
deficiency payments was also employed in the Netherlands between 
September 1973 and May 1974 when the VAT rate on farm products 
was temporarily raised in order to cushion the effects of the 
revaluation of the Guilder. 
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Figure 2. Effects of deficiency payments 
a) with net import 
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Effects on production, consumption and income 
Figure 2 represents the market situation for a particular 
product that is subject to deficiency payments. 1) The market price 
Pp„ is equal to the stabilised world market price P„ . The producer price 
Pp is reached by means of a'deficiency payment (E,-Pw). 
On the supply side the deficiency payment causes production 
S ,-„ „S 
0 to be expanded from qj> to qt". The volume of production is there-fore as large as it is under the present system. The effects for 
the producers are consequently also the same. The value of pro-
duction increases in the net import situation by A+G+B+E and in 
the net export situation by A'+D+D'+C'+G+B+E. The take-up of in-
puts increases in both situations by B+E, so that the income for 
the producers increases by A+G and A'+D+D'+C'+G respectively. 
There is no change in consumer prices in relation to the si-
tuation where there is no price support. Consequently, there are 
no price-effects on the quantity consumed, consumer's expenditure 
or utility. In comparison with the present policy there is there-
fore a lower price level and consequently less utility loss. 
Set against lower prices to consumers there is higher public 
spending which must be financed by taxation, saving on other 
areas of public spending or monetary policy. The central budget 
must in fact make up the difference (P -p ) and therefore incur 
expenditure which is equal to A+G+B in the net import situation 
and to A'+D+D'+C'+G+B in the net export situation. 
1) The reader: is again referred to Annex 2 where all the graphs 
for the various forms of price support, including figure 2, are 
reproduced for purposes of comparison. 
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Social costs and income distribution 
With the deficiency payments system income is therefore only 
redistributed between the central budget and producers and the 
burden of it does not fall, as it does at present, upon the con-
sumers via prices. If we disregard the social costs of taxation 
etc., the outcome of the redistribution effects is equal to -B. 1) 
In times of full employment in this case -B is both the social 
effect and the national income effect of deficiency payments. In 
times of unemployment the attraction of means of production to 
provide the additional agricultural production entails fewer costs 
for the economy than B+E, thus giving a maximum social and natio-
nal income effect of +E. 
So long as the social costs of taxation (savings on other 
areas of public expenditure or monetary financing) are negligible 
or slight, a system of deficiency payments will be socially more 
beneficial than the present price policy, due to the fact that 
consumers are not affected via prices. The maximum value of this 
benefit is +D. 
In fact additional public expenditure on agricultural policy 
is likely to be accompanied by a substantial increase in social 
costs. Taxpayers will suffer a loss of utility and there will be 
some groups who find themselves faced with public spending cuts 
or lose out on income transfers, while others will be hit hard by 
inflation. There will also be the cost of tax collection etc. If 
we assume that deficiency payments are financed via progressive 
taxation, the social costs of this system will still be less than 
at present, despite the loss of utility. Any transfer of income to 
agriculture via prices means that the lower income groups have to 
contribute just as much as the higher income groups, given that 
the food requirements are the same. For the lower income groups, 
however, this represents a relatively larger proportion of income 
than for the higher income groups. The loss of marginal utility 
as a result of the income transfer is therefore greater for the 
first group than it is for the second. Progressive taxation is 
specifically designed to ensure that all income groups are sub-
ject to the same loss of marginal utility as a result of income 
transfers to the budget. Therefore any income transfer to agricul-
ture via progressive taxation would result on average in a lower 
loss of utility than an income transfer effected by means of con-
sumer prices. 
From what has just been said it would appear necessary, when 
judging alternative forms of income transfer in the context of 
agricultural policy, to distinguish between those who consume 
agriculture products and those who pay taxes (usually referred to 
I) For net import: (A+G)-(A+G+B)= -B; 
for net export: (A'+D+D,+CI+G)-(A'+D+D'+C+G+B)= 
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in this report as "the central budget"). This may well be one and 
the same group of persons, but the way in which the burden of in-
come transfer is distributed within that group may differ some-
what. Furthermore it will have become clear that there is no so-
cial advantage to be gained in replacing the present price poli-
cy with a deficiency payments system if, say, this system were to 
be financed by an increase in VAT on those foodstuffs currently 
subject to the price policy, by cuts in public expenditure or in 
income transfers at the expense of lower income groups. On the 
other hand if it were financed by an increase in VAT on all food-
stuffs - or better still on all products - the deficiency pay-
ments system could be more advantageous socially than the present 
system, albeit to a lesser degree than if financed by means of 
progressive taxation. 
Effects on non-member countries 
Deficiency payments would benefit EC's balance of payments' 
current account less than the present system since no exchange 
savings would be made as a result of reduced consumption. As re-
gards the situation where no price support is given, a maximum 
exchange loss of B can occur in times of full employment. Non-
member countries would do better with deficiency payments than at 
present because they would have more outlets for sales on the EC 
markets. Internal demand would remain at the same level as that 
reached without price support, while non-member countries would 
reap an added bonus in so far as their access to the EC markets 
would be unimpeded by import levies. There is only one adverse 
effect so far as non-member countries are concerned and that is 
the fact that, as with the present price policy, they would have 
to face greater competition from an increase in EC production. 
Comparison with present price policy 
It would seem from the preceeding analysis that on balance 
deficiency payments would have fewer adverse effects on the EC 
economy as a whole than the present policy of price support. There 
would be no change in the situation for producers of the supported 
product while consumers and non-member countries would be better 
off with deficiency payments. They could, however, have some very 
adverse consequences, especially so far as the budget authority 
is concerned. The essential difference between a deficiency pay-
ments system and the present system therefore lies in the way the 
costs of the policy are distributed between the budget authority 
(i.e. taxpayers), consumers and non-member countries. 
Regional distribution of production and income in the EC 
Compared with the present policy, deficiency payments make 
for a different pattern of production, consumption and importation 
of agricultural products, while altering the distribution of in-
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come between producers, consumers and central budget. This in 
turn affects the way in which production, consumption and income 
is distributed among the different EC Member States. 
On the consumption side, there would then be no need for 
existing supported animal feed components to be replaced by un-
supported products as consumer prices would not be affected by the 
deficiency payment, nor would there be anything like the relative 
increase in the use of imported unsupported feed components that 
has taken place under the present policy. The most that could be 
expected would be some increase in imports to offset the fall in 
the EC production of unsupported products. This means that, with 
deficiency payments, stock-farmers in regions near the import 
harbours would virtually cease to enjoy relative cost-advantage 
they presently derive from their relatively lower transport costs. 
In this respect a deficiency payments system would therefore be 
less favourable for, say, the Netherlands than the present price 
policy. 
It is in the distribution of the costs of the policy followed 
that one would find a marked change from the present policy. At 
the moment these costs are largely distributed in proportion to 
consumer expenditure and countries with a relatively high level of 
food consumption currently shoulder ,the greatest burden of costs. 
Under a deficiency payments system the entire cost would be borne 
by the Treasury and would therefore be shared out in accordance 
with the arrangements for Community finance. With the current 
method of financing this would mean that countries with a high 
gross national product would bear the greatest burden. 
Table 1 shows the different countries' shares, in 1974, in 
total gross value added at factor cost and in EC consumer expen-
diture on foodstuffs. 
Table 1. The Member States' shares in total gross value added 
at factor cost and in consumer expenditure on food-
stuffs in the EC (1974, current prices and exchange rates) 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium + Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
EC 
Gross 
value added 
33.1 
22.6 
13.5 
6.1 
4.9 
16.7 
0.6 
2.6 
100.0 
Consumer expenditure 
on food 
25.7 
20.9 
19.9 
5.3 
4.3 
19.9 
1.1 
2.7 
100.0 
Taken from Eurostat Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1977, 
Tables A4 and A6. 
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The table shows that, compared with the present price policy, 
a deficiency payments system would enable the cost burden to be 
shifted away from Italy and the United Kingdom largely to the 
Federal Republic Germany. This conclusion is confirmed if one 
takes into account the fact that when there is high per capita in-
come, less of the money spent on food in the shops ends up in the 
farmer's pocket than it does when there is low per capita income 
because with greater affluence there is more demand for processing 
services (packaging, preparation, deep freezing etc.). 
Effects on unsupported products 
It was explained in the previous section that price support 
affects other products as well as those it supports. The knock-on 
effects of the present price policy occurred, as we saw, on both 
the demand and the supply side of the supported product. With 
deficiency payments there might well be price distortions on the 
supply side but not on the demand side, at least not directly. In 
this case the consequences of price distortions are therefore only 
felt at the production level. 
So far as land-related products are concerned, deficiency 
payments would mean that, as with the present policy, the input of 
land for that supported product would increase at the expense of 
other products. Consequently the prices of unsupported products 
would eventually finish up at a higher level than if there had 
been no price support. 
One would again find' that producers of animal-based products 
would be inclined to market their home-produced animal feedstuffs 
if these were subject to price support (i.e. feed grain and milk) 
and then replace them with purchases of cheaper feedstuffs. For 
instance, the proportion of milk output retained by the farmer 
(and therefore not supplied to the processor) would be no greater 
under a deficiency payments system than it is under the present 
price policy and one might even expect to see more home-grown ani-
mal feedstuffs being replaced with bought feed than at present. 
With deficiency payments, however, the price of bought feed does 
not increase as a result, as it does under the present system. The 
price of self-produced (and supported) products therefore varies 
more in relation to that of bought feed with the deficiency pay-
ments system than it does at the moment. There would therefore-
be a greater tendency than at present for animal feedstuffs to be 
shifted from one sector of production to another via the market 
and the compound feed processors. While this can encourage spe-
cialisation and thus increase agricultural efficiency, it can also 
lead to waste by involving too many middlemen and processors. 
More products would then be placed in a situation comparable to 
that of skimmed milkpowder under the present policy, where the 
producer is able to sell his product to the dairy industry for a 
good price and then, because of the subsidy on skimmed milkpowder 
used in animal feedstuffs, can buy part of his own output back 
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again at a cheap price. The sole reason for the - otherwise un-
justified - detour via the processor is the need to profit from 
the subsidy. It is difficult to say whether a deficiency payments 
system could be operated in such a way as to keep this loophole 
for wastage down to a minimum. What lies at the heart of the mat-
ter is the fact that there really is no way of separating producer 
prices from consumer prices when the products concerned are em-
poyed as agricultural inputs. This does present quite a considera-
ble problem because agriculture itself plays an important part in 
the consumption of its own products. 
Since relative prices and their levels on the internal market 
will, under a deficiency payments system, continue to correspond 
to those found on the world markets, the producers, users and im-
porters of the raw materials for foodstuffs and animal feed will 
be able to frame their actions to take advantage of the interna-
tional supply and demand in those products so that these would 
then be cheaper, in economic terms, than they are under the pre-
sent policy. In this way there would for example be less of an 
inducement for consumers to replace butter with margarine and 
grain would be less likely to give way to soya and tapioca in the 
animal feedstuffs sector. Production costs in intensive livestock 
farming would also be lower than under the present price policy. 
Differentiation of deficiency payments 
Theoretically a deficiency payments system is more suscepti-
ble for use as a method of differential income support than a 
policy that acts by supporting the market price. It would be possi-
ble, for example, to vary the amount of the deficiency payment in 
accordance with the size of the farm, the quantities of products 
marketed, or according to the region. A deficiency payments system 
as such is a more refined method for achieving income policy ob-
jectives than the present price policy, although one should not 
underestimate the administrative problems attendant upon a dif-
ferentiated deficiency payments system. 
In this context attention should be drawn to the possibility 
of varying the deficiency payments according to the country in 
which they are applied, which is an alternative put forward by 
Heidhues and others (1978). This kind of differential systemwould 
provide more scope than the present system for bringing a coun-
try's agricultural incomes into line with those in other sectors 
of the economy, and could eliminate the need for the system of 
monetary compensatory amounts. The undesirable effects of exchange 
rate fluctuations on agricultural incomes in the Member State, or 
States, in question could be absorbed through differential defi-
ciency payments (cf. the VAT adjustment in the Netherlands in 
1973-74). This system would have the major advantage of elimina-
ting internal price distortions in the EC, but major problems 
would be encountered in determining the scale of payments for 
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each country and in the question of whether the payments should 
be financed on a national or a Community basis. There also seems 
to be a real danger that such a system, like the MCAs, would allow 
the Member States too much scope for achieving national objectives 
at the expense of (agricultural) integration. 
2.3 Factor-related income subsidies 
Mechanism and general observations 
The previous sections have been concerned with policies that 
provide support for farm incomes by the indirect means of 
guaranteeing revenue per unit of output. In this and the following 
section consideration will be given to forms of direct income sup-
port. In these alternatives, products are still priced on a level 
with (stabilised) world market prices. 
This section looks at what are known as "factor-related in-
come subsidies" or subsidies on inputs. These are subsidies allo-
cated according to the size of productive factor inputs for the 
product in question. Most of the writings on this subject propose 
subsidies per unit of land. Occasionally, as with Marsh and Ritson 
(1971), subsidies per animal are mentioned, and investment subsi-
dies (for stalling facilities, for example) may also be included 
in this category. The most detailed proposals for land-related in-
come subsidies are those put forward by Binswanger and others 
(1977). Subsidies of thiskind are already provisionally paid in 
the EC for minor crops such as flax, hemp, cotton and hops. In 
this section we shall confine ourselves to considering subsidies 
per unit of land or per animal. 
Effects on production and consumption 
Factor-related income subsidies are paid by the authorities 
direct to the individual producer. This form of subsidy does in-
fluence the input of productive factors and with it the total vo-
lume of output, but does not affect, at least not directly, the 
structure of the relative prices for the various agricultural pro-
ducts. There are no price increases either for producers or con-
sumers, which means that in this respect this form of subsidy dif-
fers substantially from deficiency payments, where changes in the 
structure of relative prices do occur and the present price policy, 
where any change in prices affects both demand and supply. Since 
the relative price structure stays the same, the producer's mar-
ginal costs and marginal revenue for variable inputs (feedstuffs, 
fertiliser) are also unaltered. The amount of the output on which 
profit can be maximised is therefore different from that obtained 
under the present policy or a deficiency payments system. General-
ly speaking factor-related income subsidies result in lower varia-
ble inputs than price support and hence in a lower productivity per 
unit of factor input. 
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Land-related income subsidies: effects on the volume of production 
An income subsidy on land cannot bring about expansion of the 
total input of this factor in agriculture. The production factor 
may well be redistributed among the different sectors of produc-
tion thus escalating the volume of production in the supported 
sectors at the expense of the unsupported production sectors. 
In this respect this system is no different from the price poli-
cies discussed earlier. However, given the same level of income 
'transfers there will be a greater tendency for land inputs to be 
shifted from unsupported to supported products. In this alterna-
tive, the subsidy will be directly linked to the land factor, 
whereas with price policy it is also possible to obtain income 
support by increasing the inputs of other resources (labour, capi-
ral, feedstuffs, fertiliser). Competition is therefore greater 
for the scarcest resource - land - than it is with the other al-
ternative policies. This also means that there will be a greater 
increase in the price of land - which goes up in price whenever 
there is any form of general or specific income support in agri- ' 
culture - than would be encountered with other forms of policy. 
Misallocation of land-use does not occur, needless to say, 
if the hectare subsidy is based on the whole acreage and not re-
lated to the product farmed, but it would be possible to minimise 
the degree of misallocation with product-related subsidies if, 
when any replacement of the present price support with hectare 
subsidies took place, the amount of support did not compensate 
for the whole of the reduction of total revenue but only for the 
reduction in the difference between revenue and variable costs. 
In such cases there would also be an increase in the price of land. 
Land-related income subsidies: social costs and income distri-
bution 
The lower level of production due to the fall in productivity 
mentioned earlier and the absence of price distortions in the de-
mand for and supply of agricultural products mean that generally 
applicable hectare subsidies are certainly a form of income sup-
plementation which entails lower social costs than those encoun-
tered with the present price policy or deficiency payments. Also 
where subsidies are allocated to specific products the comparative 
advantage of there being no change in the structure of the rela-
tive prices of the final products would presumably not be cancel-
led out by the loss of land due to misallocation within agricul-
ture (not even if one allows for the additional social costs that 
would result from increased public expenditure). 
The distribution of the burden of land-related income subsi-
dies as between the authorities and consumers is wholly compara-
ble with that found with deficiency payments: the entire cost of 
subsidies is borne by the authorities, and the consumer is subject 
to neither burden nor benefit so far as prices are concerned. This 
is therefore a different situation from the present policy, where 
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it is mainly the consumers who bear the burden. 
The distribution of land-related income subsidies among the 
producers of farm products differs from the distribution of price 
support. Land-related subsidies are relatively more favourable for 
the producers with large amounts of land at their disposal regard-
less of productivity. Price support, on the other hand, benefits 
most those producers who have the highest output per hectare. It 
is quite clear from the .figures published in, for example, the 
AERI's Business Survey's ("Bedrijfsuitkomsten in de Landbouw") and 
reports on the Commission's Farm Accountancy Data Network that the 
larger farms frequently produce more per hectare than the smaller 
holdings. Apart from differences in the shape of the marginal cost 
curve, this means that larger farms receive more support than 
smaller holdings because, besides having a greater land area, 
they also have greater productivity per hectare. A land-related 
income subsidy would cut out that particular advantage. 
Land-related income subsidies: effects on non-member countries; 
regional distribution of production and income in the EC 
For non-member countries the lower level of production means 
more outlets for their trade in farm products on the EC markets 
than they have with price support. Owing to the absence of import 
levies, accessibility is present on the same scale with land-
related subsidies as it is with deficiency payments but on a 
greater scale than with the present price policy. 
The difference in income distribution effects for the pro-
ducers between price support and subsidies per hectare would also 
have an impact on the distribution of the benefits of farm policy 
as between the EC Member States because the yields per hectare 
vary from one country to another. The Netherlands, which has rela-
tively high yields per hectare, would be worse off with subsidies 
per hectare than with price support. 
The effects on the allocation of the burden among the indi-
vidual Member States of a different distribution as between con-
sumers and the budget are the same for land-related subsidies as 
for deficiency payments. Reference can be made to section 2.2 and 
to Table 1 in particular. 
Land-related income subsidies: administrative feasibility; other 
considerations 
Writers on the subject have opted for land as the factor on 
which the allocation of income subsidies should be based mainly 
for administrative reason since almost all the EC countries have 
a reasonably good system for registering the ownership and use of 
land. As a rule deficiency payments or other forms of income sup-
plementation would be much less easy to administer. 
Varying the level of income subsidy provides greater scope 
than the present policy for paying due attention to the social as-
pect of income policy. Binswanger and others (1977) suggest that 
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the subsidy per hectare should vary in inverse proportion to the 
size of the farm, thus enabling the smaller farms, which often 
have the most need of support, to derive the most benefit from it 
as well. 
Another aspect of land-related income subsidies is that the 
authorities could use them to influence the way land is used and 
the intensity of land use. We saw earlier that the subsidy in 
itself already involves lower productivity than price support. 
This may be desirable not only for market equilibrium purposes, 
but also with a view to other policy objectives such as energy 
conservation (directly or indirectly through less use of artifi-
cial fertilisers) or environmental control. Furthermore it is 
possible to provide income support for products which, generally 
speaking, are not or cannot be disposed of via the market, a pos-
sibility which is either diminished with price support or even 
non-existent. Examples of this would be the production of forage 
by the farmer for his own use or scare public commodities such as 
landscape, environment and life enhancement. One finds instances 
of this kind of subsidy at the moment such as the arrangements 
for hill farmers, the cultivation of luzerne etc. and, in the 
Netherlands, the management allowances. Finally, land-related in-
come subsidies would enable land retirement incentive payments to 
be made, thus eliminating the production of surpluses which con-
stitutes a much greater expense for the authorities and society 
as a whole. This is a possibility that is in fact exploited in 
the United States in the "set aside" programmes. 
Income subsidies per animal: effects on the volume of production 
There is no limit to the expansion of the size of the animal 
stocks, at least in the longer term, so long as sufficient feed 
is available although for biological reasons it is possible to 
increase the number of poultry and pigs much more rapidly than 
that of cattle. Moreover the traditional animal feed pattern in 
the EC is such that cattle numbers are much more closely related 
to the amount of agricultural land available in Europe than pig 
or poultry numbers are. 
Income support per animal is a strong incentive to increase 
the number of those animals. If such subsidies were paid to poul-
try and pig farmers, an enormous increase in production in these 
sectors would soon be generated, with all the negative social ef-
fects this would entail. There is therefore no point in pursuing 
this alternative any further, especially since the present policy 
provides (virtually) no support for these product sectors either. 
Support per bovine would have less effect on cattle numbers 
and could replace the price support which is given to milk and 
beef at present. 
Beef-farming would be differently affected according to 
whether the income subsidy was payable per animal marketed or per 
animal on the farm. In the first case the effect on overall meat 
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production would be the same as with price support, provided that, 
as one would expect, the amount of the subsidy varied according 
to the weight of the animal marketed. A subsidy per farm animal 
could bring about a change in the productivity per animal. This 
would be likely to decrease in comparison with the present situa-
tion, while the number of animals present would increase. 
Presumably the same would apply, only more so, to dairy far-
ming. If the present price support for milk was replaced by in-
come subsidies per animal, this would alter the relative prices 
of milk and feed concentrates, resulting in a fall in milk yield 
per cow, while the number of cows would tend to increase. Koester 
and Tangermann (1976) expected the number of cattle in the Federal 
Republic of Germany to increase to such an extent that milk produc-
tion would eventually be higher than it is under the present po-
licy. For the Netherlands, with its high concentrate-based yield 
per cow, and considerable animal-intensity per hectare, any such 
development following upon a system of income subsidies per animal 
would appear unplausible. 
Income subsidies per animal: social costs and income distribution; 
regional effects in the EC 
If the trend anticipated by Koester and Tangermann holds good 
for the other EC countries, there would probably be only a very 
small social advantage to be gained from these income subsidies 
in comparison with the present price policy and there might even 
prove to be a disadvantage in social terms. Certainly there would 
be no price distortions in the demand for milk and dairy products 
(including those as between milk and skimmed milkpowder for feed 
purposes) but, on the production side, there would be greater 
misallocation in the input of resources. The increased public ex-
penditure would also entail additional social disadvantages and 
even if there were no change in aggregate milk production, there 
would still be extra losses due to misallocation. It is plainly 
better to produce the same milk pool with a relatively small num-
ber of highly productive animals than with a larger number of less 
productive animals. The larger number of cattle would require not 
only more labour and capital (i.e. stalling facilities) but also 
more feedstuffs. The Dutch feed-rates show that, in fact, the 
total amount of feed for body maintenance and feed for production 
per unit of milk produced tends to increase once the average milk 
yield per animal starts to decline. One must therefore conclude 
that income subsidies per dairy cow are virtually certain, on the 
basis of Koester and Tangermann's assumptions,not to be more advan-. 
tageous in social terms than price support. 
As regards the distribution of the burden of the policy be-
tween the authorities and the consumer, this alternative is entire-
ly comparable with the forms of deficiency payments and income 
subsidies discussed earlier. On the other hand the way the benefit 
42 
is distributed is different from other alternatives. Income sub-
sidies per animal generate a higher income for producers with low-
productive animals and a lower income for producers with highly-
productive animals than is the case with the present price policy. 
This also means that the introduction of income subsidies per 
animal has repercussions so far as the distribution of production 
and agricultural income among the various EC Member States is 
concerned. For the Netherlands, for example, the situation would 
be more unfavourable than it is with price support. 
Income subsidies per animal: effects on non-member countries 
It is doubtful whether non-member countries would enjoy bet-
ter trade outlets with income support per animal than with price 
support. Certainly the EC's feedstuff requirement would grow if 
the number of animals rose substantially, but this requirement 
would consist primarily of feed for maintenance (mainly domestic 
forage) rather than, as with price support, feed f or production 
(mainly imported concentrates). At most, non-member countries 
could profit indirectly from the changeover to income support from 
price support through the EC's increased import requirement for 
vegetable products caused by the growth in the cultivation of 
forage crops at the expense of other arable crops. 
2.4 Direct income payments to farmers 
General 
It has been suggested in various quarters, including the At-
lantic Institute (1970), Van Riemsdijk (1972, 1973) and more re-
cently Koester and Tangermann (1977) and Heidhues and others 
(1978), that income transfers to the farming sector should not be 
tied in with the volume of production or productive factor inputs. 
The EC market would then continue to stand open to the world 
market (apart from stabilisation of short-term fluctuations) while 
farmers whose incomes were below a certain level would receive a 
direct income supplement from public funds. 
To a greater extent even than land-related income subsidies, 
direct income payments to farmers, would provide greater scope, 
depending on the form they took and their attendant conditions, 
for trying to achieve the specific income objectives and other 
(agricultural) policy aims. Firstly, income support can be aimed 
directly at the farmers who need it most. One might envisage 
raising incomes to a level comparable with the minimum wage in the 
particular Member State or region. Secondly, the subsidy could be 
made for a limited period only. Van Riemsdijk suggests that only 
the present generation of farmers should be eligible for the sub-
sidy and that the "hobby-farmer" should be excluded. The subsidy 
would be terminated when the farmer reached 65, while young far-
mers would only be given the subsidy for a maximum period of 20 
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years. Besides serving as an instrument of income policy, the 
direct income payment could therefore also help to work towards 
certain structural policy aims. Thirdly, just like subsidies per 
hectare, direct income payments also allow scope for manipulating 
production choices by means of the criteria governing the subsi-
dy's allocation. 
Effects on production and consumption 
Direct income supplementation does not affect the levels of 
producer and consumer prices. If these subsidies were to replace 
the present price support, prices in the EC would consequently 
fall to world market levels. As was also the case with hectare 
subsidies, this alternative policy would not have the same effect 
of stimulating production, via the increase in marginal revenue, 
as that theoretically achieved by price support. 
Apart from the marginal revenue effect, the volume of pro-
duction would also be influenced, especially in the longer term, 
by the income effect. A higher income would encourage labour to 
stay in agriculture while, partly in line with the labour input 
and partly because of the improved capital situation, there would 
also be a higher input of capital goods. This income effect occurs 
with all forms of income support and would be on the same scale 
with this alternative policy of direct income supplementation, 
provided that the distribution of income within agriculture re-
mained the same, as it would be with the present price policy. 
If, however, as one might expect, the allocation of the sub-
sidies is more dependent on social considerations, there could be 
differences from the present policy as regards the impact of in-
come support on the input of productive factors and consequently 
on the volume of production. Here, there are two lines of argu-
ment that could apply, with one leading to the conclusion that the 
income effect on production is greater with direct income payments 
than with the present price policy, while the other arrives at the 
opposite conclusion and argues that it would in fact have less of 
an effect on the volume of production. 
According to the first argument, the fact that the marginal 
producers in particular would see an income improvement would lend 
paramount importance to the following effects: 
1. farmers who have a low income under the present price policy 
because production is on a small scale and therefore leave the 
sector would not do so with the system of direct income sup-
plementation because of the improvement in agricultural in-
comes. The volume of other inputs would increase along with 
the growth in the labour input and this would eventually gene-
rate expansion of the total volume of agricultural production; 
2. farmers who remain in the sector under the present price poli-
cy as well but lack the capital for investment would be able to 
invest if they received direct income payments and thus to ex-
pand production; 
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3. price support provides greater security with regard to the 
money revenue per unit of output. However, there is always a 
risk of poor harvests so that there is therefore still an ele-
ment of uncertainty as to the total income level. Direct income 
payments would in fact eliminate this lack of security so far 
as this total income level is concerned and this feeling of 
greater security would be sufficient in itself to warrant an 
increased input of productive factors and thus generate a 
greater volume of production. 
According to the second line of argument, the following ef-
•efects would be paramount: 
1. farmers who do not seek to maximise their income but prefer to 
strike a balance between their level of income and the amount 
of leisure time available could be tempted by income subsidies 
to reduce their productive activities in order to achieve the 
same income level but with less effort than is required under 
the present price policy; 
2. if income subsidies were provided, marginal farms (with an 
average low level of efficiency) which would otherwise go out 
of business would continue in operation. This would stop the 
larger farms from expanding and prevent them extending their 
high productivity rate per hectare to the land of those who 
"stay put". Aggregate agricultural production would thus be 
lower than it is under the present price policy. 
It is difficult to judge which of the two arguments would be 
the most valid. A switch from the present price policy to direct 
income supplementation would probably have side-effects that 
would both increase and decrease production. Whatever the case 
may be, income subsidies are bound to have some effect on the 
overall volume of production. We shall suppose for the moment that 
the volume of production will be greater with this alternative 
policy than it would be for a policy without any form of support 
and that, due mainly to the lower marginal revenue, it would be 
smaller than under the present price policy or a deficiency pay-
ments system. 
Social costs and income distribution 
The social costs of direct income payments are lower than 
for deficiency payments or the present price policy because there 
are no distortions in the prices of agricultural products on 
either the supply side or the demand side. In this instance the 
social costs consist entirely of the difference between the re-
venue from the additional input of resources in the agricultural 
products supported and the loss of revenue sustained by those who 
would have deployed those resources elsewhere in the agricultural 
sector or outside it (plus the costs of additional public expen-
diture) . 
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It is difficult to judge whether the social costs of direct 
income supplementation are higher or lower than the costs of land-
related subsidies. Generally speaking labour would be the first 
factor of production to be affected by direct income payments 
while with hectare subsidies land would be the first to feel the 
impact. This could therefore lead one to suppose that the first 
form of income support would mainly result in labour being misal-
located between agriculture and the other sectors, while hectare 
subsidies would tend to cause misallocation of land within agri-
culture itself. The misallocation of labour would be negligible 
if the support was granted to types of labour for which there 
would be relatively little demand outside agriculture, while the 
misallocation of land would also be only slight if hectare subsi-
dies were given a general application. The extent to which the 
social cost differs from one alternative to the other appears ul-
timately to depend on how the support is distributed within the 
sector. 
As already mentioned, direct income supplementation does not 
influence consumer prices. It is comparable in this respect, and 
so far as thé burden on the Exchequer is concerned, with the 
other forms of price and income subsidies. In addition income 
transfers are likely to be less substantial under a policy which 
aims at obtaining a minimum guaranteed agricultural income than 
they would be under, say, a deficiency payments system. 
Effects on non-member countries 
Owing to the increased demand and reduced volume of produc-
tion the import requirement would be greater with direct income 
supplementation than it is with the present system and it would 
not be necessary to employ variable levies other than for short-
term price stabilisation. There would, however, be fewer trade 
outlets for non-member countries than if there were no support at 
all because of the effect the subsidies would have on production. 
Regional distribution of production and income in the EC 
The way the burden of a system of direct income supplementa-
tion would be shared out among the EC Member States is similar to 
that found with deficiency payments. The major burden would no 
longer be borne by the countries with the highest per capita con-
sumption but by those with the highest per capita national income. 
The distribution of the benefits would depend very much on 
the variant that was selected. An income subsidy system that sought 
to give all EC farmers the same minimum income guarantee would 
mean that the distribution of benefits among EC farmers (and hence 
among the Member States themselves) would be quite different from 
the present policy. If, however, a more appropriate regional ap-
proach was adopted, which sought to achieve a minimum agricultural 
income that corresponded to comparable incomes in the same region 
outside the agricultural sector, there would be less of a change 
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from the present so far as the distribution of benefits is con-
cerned. 
A subsidy system whose objective is a socially acceptable 
minimum income is likely to have an effect on the regional distri-
bution of production in the EC. Marginal producers and production 
areas would be better off than producers in areas with better 
conditions for production. 
Administrative problems 
In conclusion it must be pointed out that the introduction 
of a direct income supplementation system in the EC is likely to 
be accompanied by almost insurmountable administrative problems. 
Any income subsidies that are designed to attain a socially accep-
table minimum income would have to be based on farm accounts. 1) 
Most of the EC farms, however, do not keep accounts, which is 
precisely why VAT in the Community is collected by a flat-rate 
system and also why various countries employ a simplified system 
of income tax collection. Consequently it would seem to be quite 
impossible to administer a system whereby, for reasons of structu-
ral policy, the granting of income subsidies would depend on com-
pliance with strict criteria. 
I) It should also be mentioned that there is such a wide divergen-
ce of thought in the EC as to what should constitute a socially 
acceptable minimum income that this is also likely to prove an 
administrative problem. 
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3. Al ternat ive forms of income policy w i th direct 
supply control: quota arrangements 
3.1 Introduction 
Market equilibrium and self-sufficiency 
Promotion of equilibrium in supply and demand on the EC mar-
kets does not necessarily imply that complete self-sufficiency 
must be aimed for. Surpluses can still occur with a lower degree 
of self-sufficiency if the international distribution of labour 
makes it desirable to import products from non-member countries 
rather than producing them oneself. There may also be a wish to 
reserve a share of the internal market for external producers for 
reasons of trade policy or as a measure for co-operating with 
developing countries. On the other hand a degree of self-suffi-
ciency greater than 100% does not necessarily imply that there 
will be surpluses since it is quite possible that the Community 
offers comparative cost benefits for some agricultural products 
with respect to non-member countries. 
Since the inception of the common agricultural policy the 
EC's degree of self-sufficiency in farm products has increased. 
In section 2.1 we saw that at least part of this growth can be 
attributed to the operation of this policy. There is no reason to 
suppose that relative production costs inside and outside the EC 
have altered much in favour of the Community. Consequently neither 
the Community nor the non-member countries have been able to bene-
fit from the potential advantage of better international distri-
bution of employment while the developing countries in particular 
have been given fewer opportunities to place their competing farm 
products on the EC market. For supported products with a degree 
of self-sufficiency greater than 100% (e.g. dairy products) the 
growth in production has lead to a steep increase in the budget 
expenditure on export refunds and, lastly, the negative influence 
of EC policy on the world markets, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, has been strengthened and with it the need to store 
produce at great expense. 
The alternatives examined 
Chapter 2 showed that one of the ways in which other forms 
of income support differ from the present price policy is that 
they result in a lower volume of production and/or an increase in 
demand. The introduction of alternative forms of income support 
should therefore be able to contribute to greater market equili-
brium. 
This chapter is concerned with price support variations for 
limited production quotas. The quota arrangements are designed to 
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have a direct impact on the volume of supply. The variations under 
discussion are price guarantees for an EC-wide production quota 
(also called a mixed price system), an arrangement of price gua-
rantees for quotas awarded to individual farm firms and finally a 
system of deficiency payments for quotas also awarded per farm 
firm. 
Policy measures which directly affect the input of resources 
can also assist in the supply management of agricultural products 
and one such measure might be the retirement of agricultural land. 
For the most part, however, measures of this kind tend to form 
part of structural policy and therefore are in fact outside the 
scope of the present report, dealing as it does with price and 
income policy. Apart from the observations made in the course of 
the discussion on land-related income payments (in section 2.3), 
no other consideration will be given to this type of measure. 
Nor is this report concerned with the alternative of simply 
reducing the price of farm products substantially right across the 
board. This kind of reduction, which has been suggested, inter 
alia, by Heidhues and others (1978) 1) and which is in real terms 
partly taking place at the moment whenever there is a slight nomi-
nal price increase, would have such consequences for agricultural 
incomes as to render it socially and politically unacceptable un-
less linked to other policy measures. 
The existing quota arrangement for sugar 
At the moment the EC has a guaranteed market price for a 
limited quota of sugar production, which is shared out between the 
different Member States. The countries can decide for themselves 
whether they award quotas to individual sugar beet producers or 
whether it should apply to the national output as a whole. In the 
first instance each producer receives a guaranteed price for the 
amount of sugar supplied within the quota (which is further divi-
ded into A and B quotas) and must market the rest (the "C-quota") 
himself. In the second instance the quantity produced nationally 
above the (A+B) quota must be sold at the world market price and 
the individual farmer receives a "mixed" price for the quantity 
he has produced which is equal to the sum of the guaranteed price 
x guaranteed quota plus world market price x the rest of the 
quantity produced divided by the total quantity produced. The 
Netherlands was one of the countries that applied the mixed price 
system until 1977. Because, as we shall see later, a mixed price 
leads to an output per farm that is higher than the quota, the B 
quota is halved for countries with a mixed price. 
1) The authors of that publication calculate that a drop in price 
of at least 10% in agricultural units of account will be neces-
sary if the termination of the present MCA system is not to 
generate an increase in the degree of self-sufficiency. 
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Figure 3. Effects of a mixed price system 
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3.2 R e s t r i c t i o n of t h e p r i c e g u a r a n t e e t o an EC-wide 
p r o d u c t i o n q u o t a : mixed p r i c e and c o - r e p o n s i b i l i t y 
l e v y 
The level of the mixed pr ice 
Let us assume that the pr ice guarantee applies to the quant i -
ty of the quota product produced in the Community a t world market 
p r i ce s . We sha l l also assume that the level of the pr ice guarantee 
i s the same as the pr ice level under the present pr ice pol icy. 
In figure 3 qj? i s the production quota, P„„ is the pr ice guarantee 
an P„ the world market p r i ce . The f ina l mixed pr ice in th i s s i t u a -
t ion i s P . At th i s pr ice q^ is produced. 
4 X PEG + ( q M - q 0 ) X PW 
For P the equation i s : P = S 
. M ...... _ ^ „ _ i ... . M 
qM 
S S 
In this equation q_, P„_ and P„ are known. P„ and q are also 
related by the long-term elasticity of supply, so that the levels 
of P and q^ can be calculated, given this elasticity. 
Effects on production, consumption and income distribution with 
an unchanged price guarantee level 
As in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the lettered triangular and 
rectangular areas can be taken to represent the consequences of 
this form of price guarantee in terms of production, consumption, 
budget expenditure, income distribution, national income and ba-
lance of payments, as well as the policy's social effects. A num-
ber of them are the same as, or analogous to, the effects of the 
present price policy discussed in section 2.1, so that they can 
be summed up quite briefly. For every unit of output the producers 
obtain the same price PM, which is higher than the world market 
price P and lower than the market price ?yr- As a result output 
increases in comparison with the situation where there is no price 
support from q° to qj~. This generates an increase in income amoun-
ting to A +G. in the net import situation and to A! +D! +D +C] +G. 
in the net export situation. There is an additional input or 
resources of Ej+B. for the increase in production. In comparison 
with the present policy there is a fall in output of q^ - qj~j 
leading to a fall in income of A.+G in the net import situation 
and A'+D +D'+C'+G in the net export situation. 
For the consumers there is a price level of P„_ with a mixed 
price system. For them the effects are the same as under the pre-
sent price policy, i.e. an increase in expenditure of A.+A„+B]+B„+ 
G +G.+C-F in the net import situation and of Aj+A'-F in 
the net export situation plus a loss of utility in both situa-
tions of D+F (in which D = D +D„). 
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The budget income is G+B+C for net imports and the budget ex-
penditure is D+D'+C' for net exports. There is therefore an in-
crease in income or fall in expenditure, as the case may be, to the 
value of G+B in comparison with the present price policy. 
Social costs 
Disregarding -the relatively low social effects of the change 
in budget income or expenditure, the aggregate result or social 
effect of this redistribution of income is G -A -D in the net im-
port situation and G. - A' - D' - D - D„ - C' in the net export 
situation. It can be proved 1) that 
A = G+B and that A'+D2+D'+C' = G +B , so that compared with the 
situation in which no form of price support is given, the social 
effect of the alternative policy is -(D+B.) in both the net import 
and the net export situation, provided that there is full employ-
ment. In times of unemployment, the maximum effect is -(D+B )+E.. 
The national income effect under full employment is now -B 
minus part of D and under unemployment the maximum effect is +F-B. 
minus part of D. Consequently the social disbenefit and the nega-
tive national income effect are both less than under the present 
price policy. 
Effects on non-member countries; regional distribution of produc-
tion and income in the EC 
The same applies for the balance of payments effect: the 
foreign exchange savings on agricultural products amount to E +F, 
the minimum total exchange saving is +F-B. and the maximum saving 
is +F+E.. Under this alternative policy the EC market therefore 
offers non-member countries more sales opportunities than the pre-
sent policy but fewer than if there were no price support at all. 
The degree of self-sufficiency does increase but less than with 
the present policy. 
So far as the effects of the mixed pricing system on the re-
gional distribution of production and income in the EC are concer-
ned, these will not differ in their nature from those of the 
1) Proof for the net import situation: 
It follows from the definition of P„ that: 
PM X qM = PEG X q0 + PW X ( 4 - q0) 
Therefore: 
(pw x q o + W W - (pw x q o + A i + V + E i 
so t h a t : G+B = A-
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present policy but will be somewhat less pronounced. 
The situation changes if the quota is not for the EC as a 
whole but is awarded to the individual Member States. In that si-
tuation it would be quite conceivable that the regional distri-
bution of production would be determined by the quota rather by 
comparative cost benefits. This would lead to disparities in 
mixed price levels which would tend to cancel out the differences 
in comparative costs, thus diminishing the incentives for at-
taining optimum regional specialisation. This could largely be 
avoided if the annual quota allocated to each member state was 
adjusted to take into account the exceeding of quotas in previous 
years. 
Effects with income compensation by means of raising the price 
guarantee 
Given our previous assumptions, under a mixed price policy 
with the price level remaining the same, the agricultural income 
derived from the supported product is lower by A„+G„(= G+B.) than 
under the present price policy. This income difference could be 
eliminated by raising the guaranteed price from P__ to P' .-It''-
EG EG 
can be proved that the price increase required for this in figure 
3 is equal to G+B divided by qS. One then gets a mixed price P' 
which is equal to the present guaranteed price P„_ and a volume 
of production q5j equal to the present volume q,. 
The resultant situation is exactly the same for the producers 
as it is under the present price policy. The volume of production 
and income both remain the same. There are differences, however, 
for the budget and consumers. The higher price P' ultimately 
EG 
leads to an (additional) transfer of income from consumers to the 
budget and to a fall in consumption of the product in question, 
so that the problem of surpluses that may already exist is aggra-
vated by the drop in consumption. The social costs of the policy 
are higher than under the present price policy because the decline 
in consumption of surpluses following the price rise from P„„ to 
EG 
P' is greater than the increase in revenue (or fall in expenditu-
re as the case may be) accruing to the government budget. 
Comparable effects of mixed price system and co-responsibility 
levy 
The co-responsibility levy on milk introduced in 1977, al-
though by no means a quota arrangement, does have a number of 
consequences which are comparable with the effects of the afore-
mentioned variation of the mixed price system. The way in which 
the levy is operated - a price increase (say from P„„ to Pl„) 
EG EG 
which is partly clawed back by a percentage levy - does in fact 
effect a shift of budget expenditure on to the consumers without 
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affecting the producers in any way. 1) Without co-responsibility 
levies, the same sales policy would have to be followed as is now 
being aimed at. If, for example, dairy products from the co-res-
ponsibility levy were sold off at a lower temporary price (on the 
lines, say, of another Christmas butter scheme), the difference 
in price is then more likely to be financed from the budget as 
compared with the .present situation where it are the consumers 
themselves who fund this, difference in price. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion arrived at is that a mixed price or co-respon-
sibility levy whose application is such as to ensure that pro-
ducers receive the same income from the supported product as they 
do under the present price policy would entail more social costs 
than under the present policy, would not help to solve the problem 
of surpluses, would, in fact, intensify this problem by causing 
greater price distortion on the demand side, and would ultimately 
serve to reduce the burden on the budget. For non-member countries 
it would have the effect of curtailing their trade outlets in the 
EC as a result of greater tariff protection. The only effective 
way of attaining the desired objective would be to have a mixed 
price system which, for the producers, might well end up in a drop 
in price and income. In that case the mixed price would result in 
the burden being transferred from the budget to the producers and 
the social costs would be lower than under the present policy. A 
mixed price system is therefore not capable of helping to secure 
the income objective and the desired market equilibrium both at 
the same time. 2) 
3.3 Restriction of the price guarantee to a production 
quota allocated on a farm firm basis 
Comparison with the mixed price system 
With a price guarantee for a production quota allocated.to 
individual farms, for the producer the revenue per unit of output 
up to the quota is equal to the guaranteed price P__ and is lower 
El? 
for the succeeding units of output, say P . The marginal revenue 
1) Whether the net price increase was enough to enable the pro-
ducers to offset the increase in production costs of milk is 
beside the point. 
2) The same is true of Marsh's suggested variation (Marsh 1977) 
on the mixed price system which set a limit to budget expen-
diture on market intervention and export subsidies. 
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for the individual producers is therefore not constant, as it was 
with a mixed price system, but falls sharply at the point where 
the volume of production exceeds the quota. 
Effects on production and income with the guaranteed price level 
and equal individual elasticities of supply for all farms 
Figure 4. Effects of a price guarantee with production quotas per 
farm 
a) with net import 
supply/ \demand 
b) with net export 
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Figure 4 still assumes that the price elasticity for each in-
dividual producer's supply is the same as it is for all the other 
producers. It is also assumed that the sum of the production 
quotas allocated to each farm is equal to the production quota 
taken in the previous section, i.e. q^. Therefore, till q~ the 
marginal revenue is P_„ and beyond qn it is PIT. In this hypotheti-
cal situation there is no point in the individual farmer producing 
g 
more than qn because beyond that point his marginal costs become 
greater than the marginal revenue. 
Given these assumptions, under a system of farm quotas the 
S . D . 
total volume of production is qn and consumption q.. In this case 
the level of production corresponds to the level obtained when 
there is no form of price support, while the guaranteed price 
level is the same as for the present price policy or the mixed 
price system. The price guarantee does not result in price dis-
tortions in the supply of farm products. 
For the producers the consequent income level in the net im-
port situation is greater by A than would have been the case 
without price support. With net export this difference in income 
is A'+D'+D+C'. It can be proved that in this situation, with the 
same guaranteed price, income is lower by G in both the net import 
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and net export situation than it is under the present price policy 
without individual quota arrangements, but higher by B. than with 
a mixed price system (for triangle B. : see figure 3). 
The volume of production when the price guarantee level remains 
the same and individual elasticities of supply differ 
Individual elasticities of supply do in fact differ and may 
be greater than for supply as a whole for some producers and less 
for others. The aggregate price elasticity of supply met with on 
the market is the weighted average of the individual elastici-
ties. 
In comparative graphs like figure 4 one should find that the 
supply curve for the price-inelastic suppliers is steeper than 
the curve for total supply given in the graph, while the supply 
curve for the price-elastic suppliers is flatter. If every produ-
cer is allocated production quotas of the same size (i.e. S, S 
. . . . . V q i 
times the original volume of production) for the price-in-
S 
elastic producers the vertical q then intersects the supply curve 
at a point below P , while for the price-elastic producers the 
relevant intersection comes at a point above PIT. The result is 
W 
that with the fixed quota the inelastic producers are faced with 
marginal costs that are lower than the marginal revenue Pw beyond 
this point and are therefore tempted to exceed the quota. Any 
further reduction of the quota that may occur does not lead to an 
additional cut in production. For the elastic producers the mar-
ginal revenue derived from exceeding the quota is less than the 
marginal costs and does not make it worthwhile exceeding the quota. 
For them any further reduction of the guaranteed quota is likely 
to cause an extra curb on production because with the new quota 
the price P„ is lower than the marginal costs shown by the supply 
curve. 
We therefore find that although a farm quota system embracing 
all the producers ought to result in production being limited to 
the amount of the quota, a lesser diminution of production does in 
fact take place, and the reason for this is to be found in the 
disparities in individual elasticities of supply. If quotas are 
not to be exceeded, they will either have to be related to the 
price-elasticity of supply of the producer with the highest price-
elasticity or, instead of being shared out impartially, they will 
have to be allocated to individual producers and related to that 
producer's own price-elasticity of supply. 
Both measures would result in exactly the same situation for 
the quota-determined supply for the sector as a whole as that 
shown in figure 4. However, neither of them would work in practice. 
What might well work is a system of differentiated quotas for 
groups of producers, where the size of the quota allocated to 
each group would have to be related to the average supply elasti-
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city of that particular group. In that case the quotas would not 
be exceeded as much by the whole body of producers as it would be 
if quotas were undifferentiated. 
Comparison of the volume of production with that obtained under 
a mixed price system 
Indeed the quota allocation can be more effective, even in 
the most unfavourable situation of undifferentiated quotas, than 
it is with a mixed price system. This shows up quite clearly if 
the entire loss of income arising from quota allocation is com-
pletely offset by an increase in the price of the quantities pro-
duced within the quota. In such a case, as we saw in section 3.2, 
the production effect with a mixed price system is nil. With farm 
quotas the marginal revenue for quantities produced above the 
quota would still be P„ for both the price-elastic and price-in-
elastic producers, and the same volume of production would be ob-
tained as with a quota arrangement without an income-compensatory 
price increase. With low elasticity of supply this volume of pro-
duction is already smaller than under the present price policy. 
It is more difficult to prove that, if there was no income-
compensatory price rise, a system of undifferentiated farm quotas 
would still be a more effective instrument for controlling supply 
than a mixed price system. Obviously, it would have more effect 
on producers, who, because of their marginal cost curve, produce 
more than their allotted quota. The marginal revenue from the 
units produced above the quota is greater with a mixed price 
system than with the farm quotas. One cannot say definitely how 
the producers with greater price elasticity who keep to their 
quota would react, because if the quota is exceeded marginal costs 
would be greater than revenue price. If the marginal costs for 
these producers' allocated volume of production are below the 
mixed price they would then also produce less with farm quotas 
than with a mixed price system. If, however, with that volume of 
production their marginal costs are above the mixed price, then 
a mixed price system is a more effective instrument for control-
ling supply so far as these producers are concerned. To a large 
extent the producers' collective supply is ultimately determined 
by the size of the quota. If the size of the quota is much less 
than the volume of production that would have been selected with 
a fixed price guarantee and without a quota system, then the mixed 
price is not as high as price P and a mixed price system there-
w
 t 
fore gives a low level of output. Elastic suppliers can then, with 
a farm quota system, have a quota allocated to them that is grea-
ter than their volume of production under a mixed price system. 
In practice, given also the average elasticity of supply of agri-
cultural products, quota allocation will come quite close to the 
volume of production obtained without such a quota system. The 
mixed price is then not as low as the present price PFf, so that 
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the volume of production will not be much different from that 
obtained without a quota system. In these circumstances, a quota 
system on a farm basis soon becomes a more effective instrument 
for managing the production of price-elastic products as well. 
It seems therefore that we can also assume, even if we drop 
the principle of compensating for the loss of income, that in 
practice for all producers as a whole a system of farm quotas is 
a more effective instrument for managing the volume of production 
in European agriculture than a mixed price system. 
Agricultural income and income distribution with disparate indi-
vidual price elasticities of supply 
If price - inelastic farms exceed their quota and price-
elastic farms meet their quota in full the total quota amount for 
the sector as a whole will exceed the quota amount. The total 
quantity produced is therefore also greater when there are dif-
ferent individual elasticities of supply, at say qS as compared 
S . . . i 
with the quantity q_ given in figure 4. The increased production 
S S 
(^"QQ) is accompanied by additional revenue and costs. The ad-
ditional revenue is represented in figure 4 by part of area E, 
let us call it E. and the additional costs by part of 
(E+B), say (E.+B.). The resulting income effect from exceeding 
the quota is E.-(E.+B.) = -B. . This income effect augments the 
much greater effect G referred to earlier, so that the total in-
come effect if a quota system is introduced when there are dispa-
rate individual price-elasticities of supply is equal to -(G+B.). 
The loss of income B. is comparable to the loss B. with a 
mixed price system discussed in figure 3. B. is related to B. as 
the squares of the amounts by which the quota is exceeded in both 
systems. Since as a rule quotas are exceeded less with a farm 
quota system than with a mixed price system B. is also smaller 
than B . 1 
The fact that the exceeding of quotas leads to additional 
loss of income for all the producers as a whole when is was con-
cluded earlier that individual producers do not expand their pro-
duction beyond the point where marginal costs exceed marginal 
revenue appears to be a contradiction. The reason for this ap-
parent contradiction is that producers with a price-elastic sup-
ply receive price support for a part of the units of output that 
are produced at costs higher than V , while producers with a 
price-inelastic supply do not receive price support for any part 
of their output although they produce every unit at a lower cost 
than P„. 
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Because of differences in the marginal cost curves, the in-
come loss (G+B.) derived from the introduction of a quota system 
would not be evenly distributed among all the producers. Price-
inelastic producers have less reaction to the fall in marginal 
revenue than price-elastic producers and are able therefore to 
offset a smaller proportion of the total fall in revenue with a 
fall in costs resulting from a drop in output. This means 
that their income is subject to greater pressure than that of 
price-elastic producers and that a mixed price system suits them 
better than an undifferentiated farm quota system. 
Undifferentiated quota arrangements therefore result in in-
come being redistributed between price-elastic and price-inelastic 
producers. This occurs much less with differentiated quota systems 
and do not occur at all in theory when farm quotas are wholly re-
lated to the elasticity of supply for a particular farm. 
Effects on consumers and the budget 
So far as consumers are concerned it makes no difference 
whether with a price level of P„_ the system applied is that of 
EiVj 
the present price policy, farm quotas or mixed prices, regardless 
of whether elasticities of supply vary from one farm to another. 
The total loss of benefit as regards the situation where there is 
no increase in the market price continues to be A+G+B+C+D with net 
import A'+D with net export. 
Assuming that world market prices are independent, the situa-
tion for the budget is wholly comparable with a mixed price sys-
tem. In comparison with the present price policy, there are sa-
vings of G+B. 
Social costs 
With equal individual elasticities of supply or perfectly 
allocated differential quotas the sum of the income redistribution 
effects between producers,consumers and budget is equal to -D. 
Disregarding the relatively low social costs of altered budget 
expenditure, this figure stands for the social costs of this al-
ternative policy. These social costs stem from the losses of bene-
fit incurred as a result of price distortions on the consumer side 
and are partially reflected in the national income. 
With disparate individual elasticities of supply the sum of 
the income effects and thence also of the social costs is not -D 
but -(D+B.). Social costs as a result of price distortions are 
then incurred on both the demand side and the supply side. How-
ever these costs are still lower than the costs -(D+B.) with a 
mixed price system or -(D+B) under the present price policy. 
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Effects on non-member countries 
Non-member countries' access to the EC markets is impeded 
just as much by import levies as it is with the present price 
policy or a mixed price system, but their trade outlets are ex-
panded by an equal amount because production is managed more ef-
fectively. In comparison with the situation when there is no form 
of price support internal demand is reduced (qy - q ) as is the 
growth of output (q. - q^). 
Effects with income compensation achieved by raising the price 
guarantee 
Obviously the income loss G and (G+B.) respectively incurred 
when producers change over from the present price policy to a 
price guarantee for individual quotas can be bridged by an in-
crease in the price guarantee. In this case it would be necessary 
to have a price increase P" - P„„ equal to the difference in in-
hG hG C 
come G and (G+B.) respectively divided by the quota q_. This price 
increase with a linear supply relationship in the relevant area a d an income loss G, i  on ha f the price increase P' - P„_ 
discussed in the previous section. Also with an income loss G+B. 
one finds that P" - P„„ is still substantially less than P' - P„„ 
E.G E*G üG uu 
under a mixed price system. 
The reason that price increase (P' -P )is almost twice as great as 
hG EG 
the increase (P"_ - P„_) is that in the first case a loss of in-
come G+B has to be made up for eventually and in the second case 
this is only G and G+B. respectively, plus the fact that with 
linear supply relationships G is equal to B. 
With a mixed price system the price rise leads to growth of 
production because the marginal revenue P increases. We have al-
ready looked at this in section 3.2. There the conclusion was 
reached that the income-compensatory price increase cancelled out 
the effect of the quota arrangement. The volume of production 
ends up at the original level qS found with the present price po-
licy. 
With a farm quota arrangement the price increase for units 
produced within the quota does not lead to a change in the price 
level F for those units that fall outside the quota. In that 
case there is no reason at all for the production quota to be ex-
ceeded by more than the amount discussed earlier (q? - q_). Thus 
the income compensatory price increase does not reduce the ef-
fectiveness of the quota arrangement. One must then also conclude 
that a system of quotas allocated on a farm basis is capable of 
both achieving the income objective and controlling production. 
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A side-effect of the price increase from P_~ to P' and P" 
£i(j Ütj EiG 
respectively is that demand for the product wanes and this results 
in additional social costs and failure to achieve the desired 
market equilibrium objective. Because of the lower price level P" 
this drop in demand is less with farm quotas than with a mixed 
price system. 
The income compensatory price increase, which offsets the in-
come loss (G+B.) with farm quotas, leads to overcompensation of 
the loss of income with regard to farms with elasticity of supply 
and to undercompensation for farms where supply is inelastic. For 
compensation is only given in relation to the units of output that 
come within the quota, and the price-inelastic suppliers have 
suffered a greater loss of income in relation to their volume of 
production than the price-elastic suppliers. 
Implementation 
The main objection to a farm quota arrangement is said to be 
the problems it presents as regards administration and management. 
The EC has already had some experience of this with the arrange-
ment for sugar. The arrangement is that a full price guarantee is 
given for the so-called A quota, there is a limited price guaran-
tee for the B quota and the C quota must be sold at world market 
prices. 
In order to ensure that sugar beet producers receive a lower 
price if they exceed the quota there is a levy on output in ex-
cess of the guaranteed A quota. There is a penalty attached to 
the C quota which is designed to induce the producer to sell the 
sugar on the world market without export refunds. The central 
authority funds the costs of selling the surplus production from 
the revenue from the levy. The levy makes it possible to limit admini-
stration to checks on the amounts delivered to the sugar factories 
by the individual producers. 
A similar system for, say, milk would only require extra 
administration of the allocation to the separate suppliers of milk 
deliveries for processing in addition to the existing controls 
for operating the co-responsibility levy. One complication with 
milk (which can be drunk without processing) is the potential farm 
gate sales of surplus production. With a farm quota regulation 
such potential sales are rendered all the more attractive by the 
fact that the price advantage attainable is much greater than it 
is with a mixed price system. Apart from the additional cost of 
checks on farmgate sales one must also bear in mind the fact that 
the dairy industry is spread over a much greater number of units 
than the sugar industry, and this in itself means that much more 
extensive 'policing' is required. 
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One of the major problems with sugar is the difficulty of 
finding a basis for apportioning the quotas. Sugar production can 
vary considerably, because on the one hand the annual yield is 
affected by the different weather conditions from year to year, 
while on the other hand it is quite easy when planning arable 
farming to substitute other crops for sugarbeet. In these cir-
cumstances the choice of the criteria for determining the size of 
each farm quota can present considerable difficulties. 
One side-effect of a certain set of allocation criteria may 
be that the producer plays safe and makes sure that he can be 
certain of meeting his quota. Favourable weather condition are 
then almost sure to mean that the quota will be exceeded. 
With a product like milk where the producers can turn to 
fewer substitutes and the yield per cow is less dependent on the 
weather, the annual fluctuations in the volume of production are 
relatively less. What is more, the producer is better able to 
adjust the volume of production in the short term to suit his 
requirements by, say, regulating the amount of concentrates fed 
to the animals. Here too there will be fewer problems surrounding 
the choice of the basis for allocating the quotas than there are 
with sugar, and there is also less chance of quotas being exceeded. 
The introduction of a quota system actually entails an admi-
nistrative system partly replacing the market mechanism as the 
output-distribution mechanism. This creates scope for the distri-
bution of production to be steered along different lines from 
those it follows at present, and the choice of the basis for the 
allocation of farm quotas and the determination of the size of 
the quota are elements in this process. Thus it is possible by 
varying the basis of allocation and the size of the quota to in-
fluence the way in which production is distributed among the EC 
Member States. The present debate on possibly introducing milk 
quotas is certainly considering relating the quotas to the present 
volume of production but is also looking at comparative cost ad-
vantages, growth potentials and the possible originators of the 
present surpluses. 
If factors other than just the current volume of production 
are taken into account the quota arrangement could be more ef-
fective, the social costs could go down and the loss of income 
could be shared out more uniformly among all the producers, as we 
saw earlier in this section when discussing differentiation of 
quotas according to groups of farms with disparate price elasti-
cities of supply. 
However there is also the possibility that improper elements 
in the distribution of the quotas can have the effect of reducing 
its effectiveness and actually increasing social costs. An allo-
cation on the basis of Member States is such an improper element 
simply because there are large and small Member States. The se-
parate regions in the large Member States are able to relocate 
their production with one another internally, which is a possibi-
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lity denied the smaller Member States. One example would be a 
comparison between the Netherlands and Brittany. Both specialise 
in animal products and are undergoing considerable expansion of 
production. A quota per Member State would set a limit on Dutch 
output while allowing Breton output to continue to grow as a re-
sult of greater regional specialisation in France. It would be 
more convenient in this instance, irrespective of other drawbacks, 
for quotas to be allocated on a regional•rather than a national 
basis. 
In all cases the volume of production in the past will con-
stitute an important basis for the quota allocation. However, if 
decisions taken in the light of recent statistics continue to be 
applied well into the future there is a risk that the quota ar-
rangement could render the agricultural structure and regional 
distribution of production in the EC much more inflexible. This 
risk is most pronounced if quotas are permanently allocated on a 
farm and/or Member State basis although producers who produce 
very cheaply would still be able to profit from producing more 
than the fixed production quota. 1) 
So far as social costs are concerned, this inflexibility 
would be very detrimental, especially in the longer term. If the 
quotas were to be allocated annually aiid/or made saleable the 
chances of inflexibility would be considerably reduced, especially 
if annual allocation was based on total deliveries in previous 
years and not just on deliveries within the previous quota. 
If quotas were made saleable their price would depend, inter 
alia, on the difference between the guaranteed price and the world 
market price, as well as on the period covered by the arrangement. 
The price would also be substantially affected by the relative 
cost benefit derived from producing in large units. In this res-
pect there is a certain similarity between the price of production 
quotas and the price of land. One would therefore also expect the 
introduction of saleable production quotas to depress land prices 
because quotas would join land in becoming a very scarce "factor 
of production". This may result, especially in the land-related 
crop production sectors, in income being redistributed from land-
owners to quota-holders. Producers who wish subsequently to enter 
that sector of production will be faced with the extra expense of 
purchasing licenses to supply, but will have to spend less on 
buying land. 
The OECD (1973) points out that eventually the cost of buying 
the licences would have to be included in the production costs. 
If the guaranteed price-level is based on the level of costs then 
1) A ban on supplying more than the permitted quota would simply 
lead to greater inflexibility. 
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prices will go up. This could trigger off a cost-price spiral 
which, in addition to having income redistribution effects in 
agriculture, would also affect consumption of the product subject 
to the quota. Any price increase causes consumption to fall and 
eventually the effect of the reduction of production on market 
equilibrium would be curtailed by a drop in the demand. In the 
longer term, therefore, a system of saleable quotas would be a 
less effective instrument for restoring market equilibrium. 
One final aspect of a quota arrangement (mentioned by Kriel-
laars, 1965, amongst others) is the effect this would have on 
sectors of production not subject to quotas. In arable farming 
where there are greater opportunities for substitution this would 
be a short-term effect. In dairy farming there are often few al-
ternative uses to which the resources can be put in the short 
term, but in the longer term substitutions could also be made in 
this sector with, say, intensive livestock farming or beef pro-
duction. 
It may be desirable from the point of view of social costs 
for shifts in production of this kind to take place since this 
would keep at bay the effects of the price distortions found with 
the present policy. One would also need to prevent production 
surpluses being transferred to other supported products. If this 
should happen the effectiveness of the quota arrangement would be 
somewhat limited in consequence. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing seems to indicate that a farm quota price 
guarantee, unlike a mixed price system, is capable of helping to 
bring about, especially in the short term, both the income ob-
jective and the market equilibrium aimed at. With equal income 
transfers to agriculture the social costs are lower, despite a 
higher price for consumers, than those of the present price policy. 
The reason for this is that there would be fewer shifts of pro-
duction as a result of price distortions on the supply side. 
The quota arrangement therefore has several attractive eco-
nomic effects, although these would be partly negated if it was 
applied in such a way as to cause inflexibility in the Community's 
farming structure and regional distribution of production. 
Indeed one is led to believe that differential allocation of 
quotas is by no means out of the question. The opposite is in 
fact true and so far as economic effects are concerned differen-
tiation on a regional basis or according to groups of farms would 
be a very attractive proposition if it were based on the different 
price elasticities of supply. 
So far as implementation is concerned, the problems involved 
differ from product to product. If one wished to consider intro-
ducing quotas because of their appeal on economic grounds these 
problems of implementation are the main area in which further stu-
dy of specific products is called for. 
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3.4 Deficiency payments for quotas allocated on a farm 
firm basis 
Marsh and Ritson (1971) suggest a system of awarding defi-
ciency payments for production quotas allocated to individual 
farms. In this alternative the advantages of the price guarantee 
for individual quotas discussed in the previous section are com-
bined with those of deficiency payments. 
Effects on production, consumption and income distribution 
Figure 5 shows the supply and demand graphs, with equal elas-
ticities of supply for all producers, for a product that is eligi-
ble for a deficiency payment. The quantities demanded and supplied 
in this case are both where they would be without price support : 
there are no price increases and price distortions on the demand 
side; on the supply side price increases do not lead to an in-
crease in marginal revenue and thence to greater production, at 
least not for the average producer. 
Figure 5. Effects of deficiency payments with farm production 
quotas 
a) with net import 
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b) with net export 
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In this situation this alternative policy has no effects for 
internal consumers or for the trade outlets of non-member coun-
tries compared with the situation where there is no form of price 
support. Income is only redistributed from the budget to the pro-
ducers. This income redistribution is A in the situation of net 
import and A'+D+D'+C' in the situation of net export. It would be 
possible to achieve the same income as under the present price 
policy if additional income transfers were made to the value of G. 
In order to achieve this it would be necessary to increase the 
deficiency payment Pp-Pp which is equal to the price increase 
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P" - P__ discussed in the previous section. 
If the assumption of equal individual price elasticities of 
supply for all farmers is discarded the conclusions are slightly 
different. As with the form of production quotas discussed in the 
previous section price-inelastic suppliers also exceed their al-
lotted quota when'receiving deficiency payments for farm quotas. 
The amount by which all 'the producers put together exceed the 
quota is (q. -q?)in this case as well. The loss of agricultural 
income from introduction of the quotas is then not G but (G+B.). 
Compensation for this loss of income necessitates an additional 
increase in the budget subsidy (Pp - P_), which brings the total 
deficiency payment up to (P" - P ). However budget expenditure will 
still be (B-B.) less than for a deficiency payments system without 
quotas. 
Social costs 
Apart from the costs incurred in the redistribution of in-
come from the budget to agriculture, deficiency payments with 
farm quotas only result in social costs that stem from disparities 
between price-elastic and price-inelastic suppliers. These costs 
total B. and are greater with undifferentiated quotas than with 
differentiated quotas. 
There are no social costs on the demand side because there 
is no change in relative prices. The total social costs are there-
fore (B+D-B.) less than with the present price policy, (B-B.) 
less than with deficiency payments without quotas, lower by more 
than (B+D-B.) than with a mixed price system and lower by more 
than D than with the quota arrangement with an income-compensatory price 
increase discussed in the previous section. 
Implementation and variants 
The technical and administrative problems presented by defi-
ciency payments for farm production quotas should theoretically 
be the same as those for price guarantees for the same quotas. 
One difference in administration is that it would not be necessary 
to collect any levies or penalties for units produced above the 
quota, but there would be price supplementation to make under the 
quota. The unit price for the product is equal to P . The compli-
cation with, say, milk of farmgate sales of quantities produced 
above the quota by-passing the normal sales channels would not 
arise because in this case there is no financial advantage in 
doing so. 
The risk of causing inflexibility of the production structure 
can also be reduced with this system if there is annual allocation 
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based on the total volume of production and/or the quotas are 
made saleable. 
Marsh and Ritson also put forward as a variant on their pro-
posal the idea of varying the deficiency payments according to 
the farm or type of farm. In this way greater stress would be laid 
upon the social aspect of the income support. The individual quota 
arrangement would then more or less become a form of direct income 
subsidy with conditions attached to it that were designed to en-
sure there was no change in the volume of production. 
In section 3.3 we looked at income redistribution effects as 
between separate producers stemming from the introduction of a 
quota arrangement. Producers with a price-elastic supply would be 
overcompensated, producers with an inelastic supply would be under-
compensated. Variable deficiency payments could serve to eliminate 
this over- and under-compensâtion, although implementation of such 
a system is likely to go hand in hand with the inevitable admi-
nistrative problems. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion for this section is that a deficiency payments 
system for production quotas allocated on a farm basis is very 
attractive so far as promoting market equilibrium is concerned, 
would entail relatively low social costs, would enable agricultu-
ral incomes to be maintained without escalating consumer prices 
and would barely impinge upon the trade outlets of non-member 
countries. However the alternative policy does place a heavy bur-
den on the central budget. 
So far as administrative implementation is concerned, the 
same problems occur as with a price guarantee for farm quotas. The 
only advantage that deficiency payments for quota amounts enjoy 
in this respect is that with milk, for instance, it is not possi-
ble to bypass the quota by selling outside the normal market chan-
nels. For the market price for all units of output is equal to P,,. 
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4 . The in f l uence of t he common a g r i c u l t u r a l po l icy on 
the w o r l d m a r k e t p r i ces of ag r i cu l t u ra l p r o d u c e 
4.1 The policy's influence on the level of world market 
prices 
What has been said so far has been based on the assumption 
that the relevant world market prices of agricultural produce are 
unrelated to what happens in the Community. In actual fact this is un-
likely to be a valid assumption since the EC is responsible for 
a relatively substantial proportion of the world trade in these 
products, taking as it does 25% of the world value of imports and 
providing 8% of world exports. This would lead one to expect that 
any change in the balance of agricultural imports and exports 
(including animal feedstuffs) will influence the level of world 
market prices. In this section we are examining the effects of 
the present price policy on this area. We are not allowing for 
any costs of transportation between the EC and non-member coun-
tries. 
Figure 6. The effects of the present price policy with the EG 
having an effect on world market prices 
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Figure 6 is another version of Figure 1 and shows the effects 
of the present price policy on demand and supply. As a result of the 
price in the EC going up from P to ?„„ Community imports fall by 
„S S, , D DN W 0 E G (q,-q0) + (qn-q.) in the net import situation and exports increase 
by the same amount in the net export situation. These changes in 
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turn cause world market prices to slump from PtT_ to P.,. with the 
WO Wl 
amount of this fall in prices depending on the price-elasticities 
of supply and demand on the world markets. 
Besides affecting producers and consumers in non-member coun-
tries, this fall in price also affects the EC. In the original 
situation the import value for products with a degree of self-
sufficiency of less than 100% was E +E'+K0+K'+F0+F'. If there were 
no fall in world market prices this sum would be Kn+K' following 
on the increase in EC prices. The fall in world market prices 
means that the value of imports drops to K-. The central budget 
benefits from additional import levies to the value of K', which 
means that the present policy engenders not only C but C+K'. For 
producers the situation is not different from that described in 
section 2.1; consumers pay less to non-member countries and more 
to the central budget. The result is a social benefit for the EC 
of K' which wholly or partly offsets the social disbenefits of 
this policy and may even overcompensate for them. 1) 
With a degree of self-sufficiency greater than 100% the value 
of exports was originally Kn+K'. If there were no fall in world 
market prices this would climb to K~+K'+F_+F'+E.+E' following on 
the increase in EC prices. However the fall in world market prices 
eventually results in the export figure becoming only K.+F +E-. 
Although producers receive additional export subsidies to compensa-
te for the imbalance K'+F'+E' this is also accompanied by an ad-
ditional burden on the budget and extra social costs of matching 
proportions. 
This leads one to conclude that with a degree of self-suf-
ficiency of less than 100%, the fall in world market prices brought 
about by the present price policy causes the burden on the budget 
and the social costs to be less than they were found to be in 
section 2.1, but with a degree of self-sufficiency greater than 
100% these are both greater. The same conclusion can also be drawn 
for any other alternative incomes policy which effects changes in 
the EC's imports and exports of agricultural products. With price 
guarantees for a fixed quota it will be the producers rather than 
the budget who bear part of the burden arising from the fall in 
1) Given the price elasticities of demand and supply on the world 
markets and the revenue from alternative employment of resour-
ces allocated in Community agriculture, it is theoretically 
possible to determine what the optimum degree of self-suffi-
ciency would be so far as social costs are concerned. 
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foreign exchange revenue. 1) 
4.2 The connection between dependent world market pri-
ces and the holding of intervention stocks in the 
EC 
World market prices that are not dependent on Community policy 
should mean that every unit of output can be bought or sold on 
the world market at the same price. The level delected for a 
price within the Community then predetermines the amount of the 
refund per unit of output exported. 
If however we must assume that the world market price does 
substantially depend on Community supply and demand, the expen-
diture on export refunds will climb by more than a proportionate 
amount if exports increase. Mounting exports lead to a fall in 
the world market price which means that with every succeeding 
unit of output exported is become necessary to increase the refund 
on all the preceeding units. A point will be reached where it be-
comes more advantageous from the point of view of exchange revenue 
and budget spending to stop exporting the product altogether. One 
is then faced with the alternatives of storing stocks (in the 
hope that the market will improve), of subsidising certain forms 
of consumption, or even, as a last resort, of destroying produce. 
Therefore as regards the holding of intervention stocks for other 
purposes than their acting as buffers against short-term fluctua-
tions in supply or as part of an international stock-holding po-
licy, this is a matter of obtaining optimum exchange revenue and 
budget expenditure in the EC and is directly related to the depen-
dence of world market prices on supply and demand in the Communi-
ty. Consequently intervention is primarily designed to serve the 
Community's own interests by keeping down the costs of the policy. 
Such international considerations as prevention of dumping and 
fear of repercussions can cause the decision to switch to holding 
intervention stocks to be taken earlier than is rational from the 
point of view of minimising costs. 
The conclusion arrived at is that with dependent world market 
prices the holding of intervention stocks can help to reduce the 
agricultural policy's budget expenditure and social costs, pro-
vided, of course, that there is a prospect of profitably disposing 
of them in the future. If there is not, then the costs of holding 
stocks (interest charges, storage costs etc.) are an unneccesary 
1) Tables A and B in Annex 3 show, for two imaginary products, 
the differences in, inter alia, social costs for the various 
alternatives as between situations with independent and depen-
dent world market prices. With a degree of self-sufficiency 
greater than 100% and dependent world market prices these costs 
appear to be rather high. 
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additional burden on the central budget and result in additional 
social costs. It would then be more advantageous from the social 
point of view to destroy the surpluses. 
4.3 The sale of surplus stocks with dependent world 
market prices 
In addition to advertising and other general sales pro-
cedures , the EC has on numerous occasions resorted to subsidies 
on consumption in order to get rid of production surpluses. This 
has mainly taken the form of subsidising the sale, outside the 
normal trading channels, of stocks that cannot be sold off com-
mercially. Provided that the market for the subsidised product is 
capable of effective demarcation, it has been possible to recover 
part of the production costs. This amount would otherwise have 
been lost altogether if the product had been destroyed or have 
had added to it the further cost of permanent storage. 
This section is looking at what welfare gains can be derived 
from the subsidised sale of surplus stocks. Depending on the type 
of product, there are three categories of users that qualify for 
consideration as recipients of stocks cleared by this subsidi-
sation of consumption: internal consumers, internal users of 
animal feedstuffs and external buyers. Agricultural subsidies that 
are designed directly to restrict the supply of products by en-
couraging the farmer to produce his own animal feed perform the 
same function in this context as consumption subsidies on animal 
feedstuffs. 
The subsidies can either apply to all the consumers of agri-
cultural produce or they can be for the benefit of special groups. 
In the case of thé former internal consumers would actually ex-
perience a reduction in the market price, with the subsidy con-
stituting the difference between the market price and the producer 
price. The resultant situation would be similar to that found with 
the system of deficiency payments per unit of output described in 
section 2.2. 
If the subsidies are for special groups, these would only be 
for the benefit of those consumers singled out by reason of their 
relatively elastic demand but who at the present EC price level 
are hardly, if at all, in the market. That being the case it 
would then be possible to split up the market effectively accor-
ding to the different types of demand. If it were otherwise, sub-
sidised sales of surplus stocks would give rise to the creation 
of new surpluses elsewhere and it might be better to undertake a 
straightforward price reduction instead. 
In figure 7 the internal consumers are divided up into two 
groups. With the present price level P. only consumer group 1 is 
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in the market and the quantity demanded by this group is qj. A 
subsidyP -P also generates demand (q„) from another group of con-
1 S o 
sumers, 2. Consumers therefore experience an increase in utility 
of D0+F , which is set against a growth in- expenditure F„. The 
central authority can sell the quantity qg from its surplus stocks 
for the price P and sees its income rise in net terms by F_. 
There is no change for the producers. The outcome of this sale as 
opposed to destruction of surplus stocks is a social gain Dg+F„-
F„ = Dc on behalf of the consumers and F for the budget, the total 
o o o 
result therefore being D„+F_. 
Figure 7. The effect of a consumer subsidy for specific groups 
of consumers 
i 
p . 
1 
p . 
s 
^ group 1 \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
demand 
• 
group 2 
demand 
The net benefit D represents a net utility benefit for con-
sumers and an income benefit for others users. For consumers who 
are also producers of farm products, as would be the case with 
animal feedstuffs, this income growth can lead to expansion of 
production, as was outlined in chapter 2. The consequent with-
drawal of resources from alternative uses can engender social 
costs. In this situation the ultimate social effect is less than 
vv 
Subsidies on the consumption of farmproducts by external con-
sumers amount to additional export refunds on exports. Assuming 
that these subsidies are only given on exports to countries not 
normally traded with, these additional exports will generate ad-
ditional foreign exchange. Given that the elasticity of demand 
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on these foreign markets is the same as that assumed in figure 7 
for consumer group 2, with an additional export refund P,-Pc the 
D ' b 
quantity sold is q„ and the exchange revenue is F . This exchange 
revenue is equal to the welfare gain of the alternative policy 
and is expressed in the balance of payments of the EC. 
It is primarily the price elasticity of the demand which 
determines whether more is to be gained by selling surplus stocks 
within the Community rather than on the external market. Maximum 
revenue is obtained on the market with the maximum price elasticir 
ty (the market with the flattest demand curve in figure 7). If 
the price elasticity is the same for sales inside and outside the 
EC it is then theoretically more advantageous to make the sale 
within the Community because this generates not only revenue F 
but also additional utility D . 
One again it must be said that all this depends on whether 
effective market separation is possible. 
4.4 The influence of price stabilisation in the EC on 
the scale of price fluctuations on the world 
markets 
Both the EC and non-member countries experience short-term 
fluctuations of production due mainly to weather conditions. Un-
less the authorities or other agencies intervene these fluctua-
tions will generate price swings that are undesirable for a varie-
ty of reasons. 
The levies and refunds on external trading under the present 
common agricultural policy serve to stabilise the EC prices at 
different levels from those found outside the Community but they 
also help to achieve price stability on the internal markets, and 
are made variable for that purpose. The assumption was made in 
the previous chapters that the variable section of the levies and 
refunds would be retained in all the alternative policies with a 
view to preventing price fluctuations within the EC. In this 
section we shall be examining the effects of this mechanism on 
world market prices. 
The damming of the estuaries in the south-west of the Nether-
lands as part of the Delta Plan has reduced the water-holding 
capacity of the southern sector of the North Sea. Consequently 
the highwater mark reached on the dikes of Zeeland, where the 
waters are still open, is significantly higher than it was, es:-
pecially when there are very high tides. The same thing occurs 
when certain (sectional) markets are closed off from the world 
markets by "damming" because the variable levies and refunds come 
to act as sluices and pumps^ The dampening down of price fluc-
tuations within the EC has led to an increase in fluctuations 
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outside the Community. The world market can no longer benefit from 
the absorptive capacity of EC consumers. 
The fluctuations in the "open waters" are further aggravated 
by the fact that internal fluctuations in supply do not affect 
the internal "water level" but are released into the "open waters" 
outside. The fluctuations in internal and external production are 
therefore (virtually) exclusively absorbed by external consumers. 
The outcome of all this is that there are fluctions in world 
market prices which are much greater than they would be if there 
were no price stabilisation in the EC. 
It is theoretically possible for the Community to follow a 
price stabilisation policy that would not have a harmful effect 
on external price fluctuations. For this to happen the Community 
would somehow have to absorb within itself not only fluctuations 
in its own output but also the share of external production fluc-
tuations that its own consumers would have to take up if there 
were no stabilisation. In practical terms this means that the 
Community would have to follow an active stockholding policy. 
There are elements of the present intervention policy which hint 
at a move in that direction. 
One must bear in mind, however, that it would only be within 
the Community that a stockholding policy of this kind would off-
set the detrimental external effects of internal price stabili-
sation. Such a policy would certainly not help the EC to make a 
positive contribution towards stabilising world market prices. 
For that to happen the Community market would need to absorb a 
much greater share of the fluctuations in production that take 
place outside the EC. 
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Notes (annex 2) 
The assumption is made in all the graphs that the world market price (P ) 
of the supported product is not affected by the EC policy. It is also assumed 
that income support in agriculture remains the same in every alternative (with 
net import A+G and with net export A'+D+D'+C'+G when G=A -B=A, and 
G=A^+Dj+D^+C£-B=A^+D^+D^+C£ respectively and A'+D=Aj+D]=A^+D;J). 
The present EC price level is taken to be P., and the market prices 
(^consumer prices) are taken to be P„„, P'„ and P" respectively. The quantity 
supplied at the present price level is q.; the quantity demanded q. now. 
S 
If supply is subject to quotas the amount of the quota is qX. The producer 
revenue per unit of output is P_„, P„, P"_, PD and F' respectively. 
The graphs show that the alternative policies can be placed in the following 
order of preference. 
Given the same 
level of income 
support for the 
producers and a 
preference for (a) : 
the order of preference is as follows: 
present mixed 
price price 
policy system 
production defi- deficiency payment 
quotas per ciency with production 
farm firm payment quotas per farm firm 
low level of 
production 
high level of demand 
absence of import 
levies and export 
refunds 
trade outlets for 
non-member countries 
low consumer price 
high producer price 
low consumer expen-
diture 
low budget expen-
diture/high budget 
revenue 
low social costs 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
3 
5 
4 
3 
5 
3 
3 
4 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1 
S 
1 2 
4 
4 5 
2x) 
4 
1 2 
4 
2 
2x) 
3 
3 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
5 
2 
2 
3: 
2 
5 
2 
5 
3: 
«) 
K) 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 
1 2 
I 2 
1 2 
4 
1 
x) The order of preference applies to when the price elasticity of supply is 
greater than the price elasticity of demand. It will be different for a 
relatively greater elasticity of demand. 
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Annex 2. A comparison in graph form of the effects of various forms of price support 
when world market prices are independent of EC policy 
1. The present price 
policy 
a) with net import 
supply/ ^demand 
h) with net -export 
demand \ 
2. A guaranteed price 
for a collective 
'production quota 
(mixed price system) 
3. A guaranteed price 
for a production quota 
allocated on an 
individual farm firm 
basis 
(differentiated ) 
(according to ) 
(elasticities of) 
(supply ) 
4. A deficiency 
payment per 
unit of output 
A deficiency pay-
ment pertunit of 
output for pro-
duction quotas 
allocated on an 
individual farm 
firm basis 
(differentiated 
(according to 
(elasticities of ) 
(supply ) 
fsupply 
transfers from 
' ^ consumers to 
producers 
I transfers from 
budget to 
' producers Itransfers from consumers to budget | \ /Isocia L d « M I COStS 
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Annex 3. Numerical magnitude of effects of alternative forms of price support 
for two imaginary products with world market prices that are 
independent of and dependent on EC policy respectively 
These tables assess the volume, price and value effects of alternative 
price policies for two hypothetical products. It is assumed that the total 
agricultural income support per unit of output remains the same. It is also 
assumed that any production quotas are fixed at the level of production that 
would be achieved without price support. The long-term price elasticity of 
demand in the EC is -0.2 for both products, the price elasticity of supply is 
0.7 and both are calculated on the basis of the level of prices and volume 
obtaining under the present policy. Finally, it is assumed that the income for 
producers is equal to 67% of the level of revenue under the present price 
policy. 
There are two sets of calculations for each product and each alternative 
policy so that one can clearly see the differences between the two situations 
when world market prices are independent of and dependent on EC policy. The EC's 
share of imports and exports is assumed to be the 25% of world trade that it is 
with the present price policy. 
For the product in Table A it is assumed that EC production under the 
present policy is 8.5 million tons and consumption is 9.5 million tons. The 
Community price is 320 UA per ton and the world market price is 290 UA per ton 
in the absence of distortion by the EC. In the case of world market prices 
being dependent on the EC there is, at this price, a price elasticity on the 
world markets of -0.5, given an international volume of trade amounting to 
4 million tons. 
For the product chosen in Table B the EC output, under the present price 
'policy, is 105 million tons and consumption is 75 million tons. The Community 
price is 150 UA per ton. At this price and volume level the world market price 
without EC distortion is 125 UA per ton, world trade is 120 million tons and 
price elasticity is -0.2. 
In both tables the sum of the additional potential uses by producers, 
budget and consumers plus the increase in expenditure on raw materials is taken 
to be equal to the balance of trade for agricultural products. This balance 
minus the purchase of agricultural raw materials and plus the welfare gain for 
consumers gives the social effect of the alternative policy. 
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